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Causal Uncertainty and Damages Claims for Infringement of Competition Law 
in Europe 
 
Ioannis Lianos 
 
Abstract 
In a tort law regime established on the basis of corrective justice considerations, 
causation requirements will tend to play a predominant role in regulating the 
damages claims brought forward. The requirement of the causal link between the 
harm suffered and the anticompetitive conduct in damages claims for infringement of 
EU competition law has nevertheless received remarkably little attention in the 
recently adopted EU Damages Directive and in academic literature. The Damages 
Directive and some recent case law of the Court of Justice of the EU proceed to 
some limited harmonization of evidential presumptions and procedural requirements, 
as well as the exclusion of national rules that may deny the right of the parties 
harmed by the competition law infringement to receive compensation. Yet, the 
contours of the requirement of causal link are left to the interpretative work of 
national courts, in view of their respective tort law doctrines on causation and the 
lack of a proper EU tort law. The study first explores the role of the concept of 
causation in claims for damages for infringement of EU competition law and the 
different approaches taken by the legal systems of EU Member States in 
conceptualizing the inquiry of a causal link. It then focuses on the methods used by 
the tort law systems of the EU Member States, the recent Damages Directive and 
the case law of the EU Court to engage with situations of causal uncertainty, which 
may frequently arise in the context of competition law actions for damages, in view of 
the complexity of the commercial environment and the multiple factors influencing 
markets.  
Keywords: causation, causal link, damages, competition law, antitrust, scientific uncertainty, 
multiple tortfeasors, comparative law, tort law, joint and several liability, proportionate 
liability, EU Damages Directive, umbrella customers, indirect purchasers, but for test 
JEL Classification: A12, K13, K21, L4, L40 
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Causal Uncertainty and Damages Claims for Infringement of Competition Law 
in Europe 
 
Ioannis Lianos* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In Courage Ltd v Crehan1 , the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
expressly recognized the existence of a right to claim damages on the basis of the 
direct effect of the provisions of EU competition law.  In doing so, the CJEU planted 
the first seeds of what would constitute one of the most remarkable reforms in the 
five decades of EU competition law enforcement - introducing damages claims for 
the infringement of EU and national competition law2. In Manfredi, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) proclaimed the right for any individual to claim 
compensation for the harm suffered “where there is a causal relationship between 
that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited” under Article 101 TFEU (and/or 
Article 102 TFEU)3. The Court did not elaborate further on the requirement of a 
causal link, but simply referred to “the legal system of each Member State to 
prescribe the detailed rules governing the exercise of [the] right [to damages], 
including those on the application of the concept of ‘causal relationship’ between an 
antitrust infringement and the harm suffered”, “provided that the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness are observed”4. The recently voted Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of 
the Member States and of the European Union (hereinafter Damages Directive), 
stipulates in its Article 3 that “Member States shall ensure that any natural or legal 
                                                          
*
 Professor in Global Competition Law and Public Policy, Faculty of Laws, UCL; Director, Centre for 
Law, Economics and Society, UCL; Lead Researcher, Skolkovo Laboratory on Law & Development, 
National Research University, Higher School of Economics. The article draws on research completed 
for I. Lianos, P. Davis & P. Nebbia, Damages Claims for the Infringement of Competition Law (forth. 
2015, OUP). The author would like to thank Peter Davis, David Gilo, Herb Hovenkamp, Wolfgang 
Kerber and Sandy Steel for their comments to earlier versions of this paper. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
1
 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others 
[2001] ECR I-6297. 
2
 For an historical perspective, see, among others, V. Milutinovic, The Right to Damages under EU 
Competition Law: From Courage v. Crehan to the White paper and beyond (Kluwer Law International, 
2010). 
3
 Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi & others [2006] ECR I-6619, paras 61-63. See also, 
Case C-199/11, Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV [2013] ECR [not yet published], paras 43-44 
(noting the role of the national courts in civil proceedings for damages, to determine the damage and 
the causal link between the infringement and the damage). 
4
 Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi & others [2006] ECR I-6619, para. 64.  
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person who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of competition law is able 
to claim and to obtain full compensation for that harm”5. 
The conferral of standing in EU law to anyone harmed by a competition law 
infringement opens theoretically the gates to a flood of claims for damages initiated 
by those having suffered damages. Yet, the analysis of all the published competition 
law damages cases in the four most important jurisdictions in the European Union, in 
terms of the size of their economy, from 1999 to 2013 indicates that the 
overwhelming majority of damages claims leading to court judgments has been 
initiated by direct purchasers and competitors, with a handful of cases being initiated 
by other groups of claimants, such as indirect purchasers, which may seem rather 
odd for a remedy perceived as aiming to provide full compensation to those affected 
by a competition law infringement. 
The reasons for this poor representation of certain categories of claimants 
may include the relative uncertainty until recently in some jurisdictions of the 
standing of indirect purchasers.  In addition, the absence of proper collective redress 
systems in most EU Member States has also clearly been a very significant factor.6 
The standing issue resolved, for the future, the question is whether we will see a 
litigation flood. Whether we do may result from the central role played by the aim of 
compensation (and more broadly corrective justice) in the legal framework in Europe 
on actions for competition law damages. An approach focusing on compensation 
and corrective justice requires that causation be proven and this will inevitably 
become a central issue in actions for damages for competition law infringements, 
eventually regulating the extent of competition damages litigation in Europe7.  
                                                          
5
 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the European Union (hereinafter Damages Directive), [x] OJ (emphasis added). 
6
 For example, Which? brought the first UK representative action for damages against JJB sports in 
2007 on behalf of consumers who purchased football shirts at cartelised prices in 2000-2001, 
following an OFT infringement decision in 2003.  However, as Which describe “as we had to operate 
under an opt-in system, the number of consumers opting in was very low considering the degree of 
publicity, the amount of resources we spent and the external legal costs.” See 
http://www.which.co.uk/documents/pdf/collective-redress-case-study-which-briefing-258401.pdf     
7
 Law and economics scholars question the central role of causation in tort actions by taking an ex 
ante perspective based on the concept of efficiency. They advance the view that responsibility should 
be imposed on the person best placed to avoid the loss most cheaply (cost avoidance theory): see, 
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirchsoff, Towards a Test in Strict Liability in Torts, (1972) 71 Yale L J 
1055; Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, (1973) 2 Journal of Legal Studies 205. They 
also consider that the creation of an increased risk of some harm in these circumstances would 
constitute causation of that harm, thus subjecting the question of actual causation to policy 
consideration with regard to the “efficient” attribution of responsibility. According to this view, an actor 
is held liable if he fails to take care when the burden of care (Bc) is less than the outcome of the 
probability of loss (pL) and the amount of the loss (aL) (e.g. Bc˂pLaL, that is that is (Bc) is less than 
the sum of (pLaL)). Other law and economic scholars advance a different positive economics rather 
than normative economics perspective, taking less a forward-looking approach and focusing more on 
the study of incentives affected by the test of factual causation applied, thus emphasizing the role of 
the factual causation inquiry: see, for instance, Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of 
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Surprisingly, causation has received remarkably little attention, as neither the 
preparatory works for the Damages Directive, nor subsequent legal commentary, 
have paid any attention to it8. The issue is not, as such, discussed in the Damages 
Directive (although it is indirectly touched upon with the establishment of a causal 
presumption for cartel harm) and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) refused to 
develop a common EU law based framework on causality in Kone, despite being 
invited to it by its Advocate General9, thus leaving the task to national legal systems 
of general tort law. 
I will first address the role of the concept of causation in claims for damages for 
infringement of competition law and discuss the different approaches taken by the 
legal systems of EU Member States in conceptualizing the inquiry of a causal link 
(II). I will then focus on the methods used by the tort law systems of the EU Member 
States, the recent Damages Directive and the case law of the EU court to engage 
with situations of causal uncertainty, which may frequently arise in the context of 
competition law actions for damages, in view of the commercial environment and the 
multiple factors influencing markets (III). A conclusion follows (IV). 
 
II. Unpacking the requirement of a causal link in actions for damages 
for competition law infringement 
 
A. Setting the stage: the role of causation in actions for damages for 
infringement of competition law 
 
The requirement of causation is a common feature of tort law in the EU Member 
States for damages actions10. Causation requirements have also been inherent in 
the development of the substantive provisions of EU competition law, beyond the 
context of a claim for damages11. Causation can be part of the liability analysis (in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Negligence, (1983) 92 Yale Law Journal 799-829. For a discussion of these different perspectives in 
law and economics literature, see Keith Hylton, Causation in Tort Law: A Reconsideration in Jennifer 
Arlen (eds.) Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts (Edward Elgar, 2013) 97-113. 
8
 For an exception, see Hanns A. Adele, Georg E. Kodek, G.K. Schaefer, Proving Causation in 
Private Antitrust Cases, (2012) 7(4) Journal of Competition Law and Economics 847-869. 
9
 Case c-557/12, Kone AG and Others v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG [June 5th, 2014]. 
10
 See, Christian von Bar, Causation or Attribution, in The Common European Law of Torts: Volume 
Two (Oxford University Press, 2000), 433-498; Isabel C. Durant, Causation, in Helmut Koziol & 
Reiner Schulze (eds.), Tort Law of the European Community (Wien: Springer, 2010), 47-80. 
11
 The development of the counterfactual method constitutes to that respect an illustration of the 
importance of causation in EU competition law: Ioannis Lianos, Causation in EU Substantive 
Competition Law (forth. CLES Research paper 5/2014); More generally on the rise of the 
counterfactual method in EU competition law, Damien Geradin & Ianis Girgenson, The Counterfactual 
Method in EU Competition Law: The Cornerstone of the Effects-Based Approach (December 11, 
2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1970917 ; Antonio Bavasso & Alistair Lindsay, 
Causation in EC Merger Control, (2007) 3 (2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 181-202. Of 
particular interest, with regard to this issue, is the way EU competition law deals with attempts of 
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order to establish the infringement of competition law), as well as an inherent part of 
damages analysis. This paper will focus on the second aspect. 
Causation was among the issues put forward by the European Commission in its 
Green paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules as a possible 
factor having an impact on the development of antitrust damages claims in Europe, 
although the Commission kept away from making any specific suggestions on this 
topic.12 The Commission Staff Working paper, annexed to the Green paper, 
highlighted three challenges arising out of the application of the concept of causation 
in actions for damages for infringement of EU competition law.  
First, proving a causal link in antitrust damages cases “will often require complex 
economic analysis based on a large number of facts and economic data”, thus 
hinting to the practical and theoretical challenges arising out of the import of the 
concept of economic causality in a legal and factual setting13.  
Second, the legal systems of Member States adopt different approaches with 
regard to the legal concept of causation: an issue that was also highlighted in the 
European Commission’s commissioned study on the conditions of claims for 
damages for infringement of EU competition law14. The Commission, however, 
observed that the application of these concepts in concrete cases “will not lead to 
widely diverging results and that the concepts derive from the legal culture of the 
jurisdictions in question more than to actual differences in appreciation”15. For this 
reason, and more generally because of the important role played by the case law in 
this context, the Commission Staff Working paper did not consider that any 
harmonization action was necessary in this field in order to facilitate damages 
claims. One should also keep in mind the harmonization initiatives currently 
considered, at the aftermaths of the publication of the Common Frame of 
Reference16 and the option for a European Civil Code17.  
Third, the Commission stressed that the application of a given national law on 
causation should not lead to the exclusion of groups of victims of anti-competitive 
behaviour from recovering their losses, hence compromising the objective of 
effective competition law enforcement.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
anticompetitive practices (see, Ioannis Lianos, Causation in EU Substantive Competition Law (forth. 
CLES Research paper 5/2014) 
12
 European Commission, Green paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
SEC(2005) 1732, question N. 
13
 European Commission, Green paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
SEC(2005) 1732, question N. 
14
 See also, Ashurst, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules, Comparative Report, August 31, 2004. 
15
 Commission Staff Working paper, Annex to the Green paper, Damages for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672 final, para. 275. 
16
 See, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf  
17
 See, http://www.sgecc.net/  
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The application of the national requirements for causation is subject to the double 
discipline of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, and in particular the 
second principle, which, as the Commission staff paper highlights, may “influence” 
notions of causation as existing in national civil law and eventually lead to their 
clarification so as to facilitate damages actions further18. Yet, no concrete proposals, 
as to how this influence will be exercised and to which direction (strong or weak 
requirements of causality), have been put forward. This is probably because of 
important “cultural” differences in the national tort law systems and the way they 
assess causation, and the difficulties arising out of the need to integrate the 
economic concept of causality to a common legal core.  
The concept of causation was not even mentioned once in the White paper on 
Damages Actions, although it was acknowledged in the annexed Staff Working 
paper that having to demonstrate in detail the causation and quantification of 
damages remains a particular difficulty in competition cases, especially for 
anticompetitive behaviour to which several infringers have contributed to19. The 
option of lowering the standard of proof so that less evidence or a lesser degree of 
likelihood would suffice to prove causation or that of shifting the overall burden of 
proof were not, however, found appropriate solutions to mitigate these difficulties.  
The recent Damages Directive20 also does not deal explicitly with the issue of 
causation and does not include any harmonized rule as to the appropriate causation 
test and its operation in actions for damages for the infringement of EU competition 
law. Causation is only mentioned en passant in the Practical Guide on quantifying 
harm, as essentially a matter for national law, in the absence of rules at the EU level 
on this matter. It is also noted in this document that national requirements on 
causality or proximity that link the illegal act and the harm should observe the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness21. However, the exact application of 
these two principles, in particular the second one, and the nature of the obligations 
they impose to Member States’ legal systems remain unclear, the only limit so far 
explicitly mentioned being that victims of anticompetitive practices enjoying standing 
should not be, as a group, denied the possibility to claim damages, because of a 
restrictive interpretation by the national court of domestic causation requirements.  
                                                          
18
 Commission Staff Working paper, Annex to the Green paper, Damages for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672 final, para. 276. 
19
 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White paper on Damages actions for breach of 
the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final. 
20
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the European Union (hereinafter Damages Directive), [x] OJ. 
21
 Commission Staff Working Document – Practical Guide Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages 
Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
C(2013) 3440. 
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While standing issues have been thoroughly considered and determined as a 
matter of EU law by the Court of Justice in Courage, later in Manfredi and 
harmonized in Article 2 of the Damages Directive22, causation remains subject to the 
requirements of the domestic legal systems of the EU Member States. The subtle 
differences in the exact meaning of the concept of causation in various legal 
traditions and the reluctance of the Court of Justice of the EU to proceed to a 
definition of the contours of the concept in actions for damages for infringements of 
EU competition law in view of the possible repercussions to the general system of 
tort law in each jurisdiction, may have played a role in this decision initially to defer to 
national courts for the interpretation and implementation of this concept.  
From a theoretical viewpoint, questions of standing, the related issue of passing 
on and causation are intrinsically linked23. A broad definition of the categories of 
victims that will be allowed to sue for antitrust damages (standing) as including 
anyone harmed24, thus at the same time enabling the consideration of passing on 
(for indirect purchasers), will inevitably raise issues of causation and proximity of the 
harm to the illegal act. This is particularly so, in view of the fact that the principal 
objective pursued by the claim for antitrust damages for infringement of EU 
competition law is corrective justice and compensation, and not just deterrence. This, 
inevitably influences the legal concept of causation adopted in this context, as it also 
does for issues of standing, antitrust injury and recoverable damages25. The 
requirement of causation in order to claim antitrust damages for infringements of EU 
competition law plays a similar role to the requirements of standing and antitrust 
injury in US antitrust law in limiting possible claims for damages, possibly leading to 
under-compensation (in the EU context) or under-deterrence (in the US context), 
should these concepts be interpreted restrictively26. 
                                                          
22
 Providing for the right of “anyone who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of Union or 
national competition law” to claim “full compensation” for that harm. 
23
 Centre for European Policy Studies, Final Report, Making antitrust damages actions more effective 
in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios, December 21, 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf#page=4
41 , pp. 36, 145, 415-416. 
24
 Including direct and indirect purchasers, potential consumers who would have liked to purchase the 
given goods, but refrained to do so because the price was set at a supracompetitive level and who 
ended up either not buying anything or a lower-quality good, competitors foreclosed from the relevant 
market as a result of the anticompetitive agreement, future consumers harmed by the exclusion of 
competitors whose presence could lead to future potential output increase, product differentiation, 
lower prices, new products and higher quality, umbrella customers, etc. 
25
 Centre for European Policy Studies, Final Report, Making antitrust damages actions more effective 
in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios, December 21, 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf#page=4
41 , pp. 415-416 (noting that if one takes a corrective justice perspective, “a broader set of losses 
would be included in the awardable damages, and standing would be granted to a larger set of 
victims”). 
26
 This is particularly so for tort law regimes that depart from a general rule on liability leaving it to the 
courts to set the limits of its application (e.g. France) and do not impose extra requirements, such as 
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Because of a restrictive interpretation of the requirements of causation in some 
Member States “some categories of harmed individuals or firms may not be able to 
prove the harm suffered or the causation link”, with the result that the social harm or 
the full amount of the harm inflicted will be higher than the private harm 
compensated through antitrust damages actions27. As it is shown by an empirical 
analysis of the actions for damages for competition law infringement from 1999 to 
2013 in the five most important jurisdictions, in terms of the number of cases, in the 
EU, the overwhelming majority of the damages actions is brought by direct 
purchasers or excluded competitors, a category of litigants for which establishing a 
direct causal link between the anticompetitive conduct and the harm suffered does 
not present insurmountable difficulties28. 
As we will explain further below, certain categories of consumers, such as 
indirect purchasers, umbrella customers and counterfactual (potential) customers, 
may find it difficult to establish a direct causal link between the anticompetitive 
conduct and the damage they suffer, in view of the restrictive approach followed in 
certain European tort law systems on the causal link required by domestic tort law. 
Identifying the causation nexus in order to trace the overcharge may also prove 
impossible in some cases in which the anticompetitive practice affected various 
successive market levels, sometimes not vertically linked to the infringer. The twin 
concepts of causation and damage apportionment, in practice, have the potential to 
play the filtering or limiting function that other procedural and substantive rules have 
played in the development of private actions for damages in US antitrust law, 
although causation also plays its part as well in the US, in particular in view of the 
important implications of the finding of liability for antitrust harm, in particular treble 
damages. The next section briefly introduces the nature of the inquiry of the 
existence of a causal link in a legal setting. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the duty of care in English tort law or the requirements of unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigket), intention or 
negligence (Verschulden) and Tatbestand in German tort law: Cees van Dam, European Tort Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2013), §605-2. 
27
 Centre for European Policy Studies, Final Report, Making antitrust damages actions more effective 
in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios, December 21, 2007, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf#page=4
41 , p. 418. 
28
 I have examined the case law on damages claims for the infringement of EU and national 
competition in the five most significant (in terms of the size of the economy) jurisdictions in Europe 
(Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain) from January 1999 to December 2013. The only jurisdictions in 
which damages claims were introduced by indirect purchasers were the United Kingdom 
(representing a little more than 9.3% of the total number cases) and Germany (2% of the total number 
of cases). I have not been able to identify any cases initiated by indirect purchasers in France, Italy 
and Spain. Neither was I able to identify any cases brought in any of the examined jurisdictions by 
umbrella customers or counterfactual customers. For a description and analysis of the results, see 
Table 4.1. at I. Lianos, P. Davis & P. Nebbia, Damages Claims for the Infringement of Competition 
Law (forthcoming 2015, Oxford University Press). 
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B. Distinguishing the factual from the normative element: the interplay of 
causation in fact and causation in law (or scope of liability) 
 
In law, causation refers to causal connections between events29. The principal 
function of causation in law is to explain the occurrence of particular events, to 
control events and to attribute moral responsibility to agents whose action has 
provoked the events. The idea is that among the variety of relationships between 
events (e.g. agency and harm), only some will be considered to constitute a legally 
causal relationship. Which relationships are selected as causal, will depend on the 
aims of establishing legal causation.  
Legal causation may serve two main purposes: (i) it is backward 
looking/explanatory; and (ii) it is attributive (e.g. establishing the responsibility of 
agents for the outcomes that follow their actions)30. When the concept of causation is 
used for the first, explanatory, purposes, it is usually referred to as causation in 
fact31; when it is employed for the second, attributive, purpose, it is usually referred 
to as causation in law. These two functions are not always pursued when one 
employs the concept of causation in science. For example, statistical causality 
adopts an empirical view of causation focusing on regulatory or constant conjunction 
as a necessary condition for causation. In general, this would not be considered as 
sufficient to establish legal causation, as causality employed in science usually relies 
on a causal generalization (that events of a type similar to event A almost always or 
regularly occur jointly or simultaneously with events of a type similar to event B, 
without it being possible to substantiate this finding for all the events of types A and 
B as there might be some instances in which this conjunction cannot be observed). 
The legal concept of causation would require instead a concrete instantiation of a 
causal law on the particular occasion, regarding the existence of a causal link 
between the specific event A and the specific event B32.  
This cautious approach followed by causation jurisprudence may be explained by 
its function to attribute responsibility to agents, and the legal consequences for the 
individual’s autonomy that may follow from a finding of liability. The use of the 
                                                          
29
 In that sense, it can be distinguished from a logical connection (as cause and effect are 
independent of one another, which is not the case for logical connections) and from statistical causal 
connections, as for legal causation the determination of the causal relation is unique (connection 
between events). Part of the following developments draw from Jan Hellner, Causality and Causation 
in Law, (2000) 40 Scandinavian Studies in Law 111-134. 
30
 Antony Honoré, Causation in the Law, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-
law/>. 
31
 X is a factual cause of Y if (i) Y actually occurred, and (ii) X is a necessary condition for Y. 
32
 Richard W. Wright, Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief, in R. Goldberg (Eds.) Perspectives 
on Causation (Hart Pub. 2011) 195-220. 
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concept of causation in science (e.g. economics) does not lead to similar normative 
consequences, the search for a causal link being not confined to a specific 
decisional context, thus enabling its constant revision, according to more recent 
findings. Furthermore, one of the functions of causation in science may be to assist 
the scientist in making predictions over the probable consequences of an event or a 
category of events, in particular specifying “what will happen and by what stages if 
certain conditions are present together”33. This predictive and “forward-looking” 
function of causation is generally absent from tort law, the latter focusing only on 
examining “which earlier conditions best account for some later event or state of 
affairs”34. Counterfactual reasoning in tort law should therefore be clearly 
distinguished from prediction involving speculation, as they relate only to past events 
and possible worlds that are on a par with actual worlds. Notwithstanding this 
emphasis of general tort law on past events, recent practice of extending liability 
rules in a regulatory setting in which certain conduct may lead to a finding of liability 
because its likely effects (in the future) are incompatible with the objectives pursued 
by the specific regulation, raises the issue of prediction and how statistical or 
econometric evidence fits with the use of the counterfactual inquiry in law. This is an 
issue explored in Part III.  
The remainder of this Section introduces the different concepts of causation in 
fact that have emerged in tort law scholarship, in view of the various approaches 
adopted in the tort law of EU member States, before examining the elusive character 
of the distinction between causation in fact and causation in law (responsibility) and 
the need to take into account the values represented and the objectives followed by 
the choice of the instrument of tort law as a method of regulation in a particular 
setting, such as the enforcement of competition law.  
 
1. Causation in fact 
 
A frequently used taxonomy of causation in fact distinguishes between 
individualizing and generalizing theories of causation, the former insisting “that there 
is a quality of being a cause or being causally efficacious which inheres in or belongs 
to particular acts or events and perhaps also omissions”, while the latter rely on the 
view that “every particular statement is implicitly general in the sense that its truth is 
dependent on the truth of some general statement of regularities”, thus deriving the 
                                                          
33
 Antony. Honoré, Causation in the Law, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-
law/>. 
34
 Antony Honoré, "Causation in the Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/causation-
law/>. 
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causal quality of a particular action or event from “the fact that it is an instance of a 
kind of event believed to be regularly or generally connected with an event of some 
other kind”35.  
 
a. Individualizing theories: equivalence of conditions and NESS 
 
According to the theory of equivalence of conditions, any necessary condition for 
the occurrence of the damage may be considered as having caused the damage. 
The theory derives from Mill’s statement that “all the conditions” are “equally 
indispensable to the production of the consequent”, the statement of the cause being 
“incomplete, unless in some shape or other we introduce them all”36. In view of the 
attributive function of causation in the law, which is not predominant in the context of 
philosophical inquiry (emphasizing explanation), legal scholars have attempted to 
extract from the “necessary” conditions that which has caused the damage. 
However, each necessary condition is logically equivalent to the other necessary 
conditions, thus leading to the impossibility of establishing, at this level of the causal 
inquiry, a graduation between the necessary conditions for the occurrence of the 
damage. In view of the fact that all conditions, but one, cannot produced the damage 
and that all necessary conditions are equivalent, each of the necessary conditions 
constitutes the cause of the damage. Hence, as long as a specific conduct has set 
one of the necessary conditions for the occurrence of the damage, it forms part of 
the causal chain, even if other facts may also have contributed to the occurrence of 
the damage. The equivalence of conditions theory requires the identification through 
a but for test relying on a thought experiment formulating a counterfactual scenario 
of potentially necessary conditions, in order to identify the conditions sine quibus non 
of the damage, that is, the necessary conditions, absent which, the specific damage 
would not have occurred.  
The “but for test” entails a strong necessity requirement, expressed in the familiar 
counterfactual inquiry. According to this test, “a condition is a cause of some result if 
and only if, but for the occurrence of the condition, the result would not have 
occurred, considering the circumstances that existed on the particular occasion”37. 
Hence, when applying the but for test, “the condition being tested, Q, is 
hypothetically eliminated and the world is run forward from that point, leaving all the 
other actual conditions the same insofar as possible, to see if the result, R, still would 
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have occurred”38. The test thus enables the equal inclusion as a cause in fact of 
conditions that just contributed to the result as well as of conditions that were a 
substantial factor in the occurrence of the result.  
The test may lead to a finding of no causation (underinclusiveness issue) even 
though it is clear that the conduct in question contributed to the injury (the so called 
“overdetermined causation” problem).  For instance, in cases of causal redundancy, 
when a cause is redundant with regard to an effect, as the effect would have 
occurred even if the cause had not (pre-emptive causation), or when two conditions 
are simultaneous or successive and the actual condition would have caused the 
same damage as the initial one (duplicative cause), the test may not assist the 
decision-maker in identifying the relevant cause, and hence the actor that should be 
held responsible39. In this instance, if the courts are to choose “the” relevant cause, 
they will have to do this either on the basis of another factual causality test than the 
“but for” test or in the context of the relevant causation in law requirements.  
To provide a competition law related example, suppose that the decision-maker 
considers whether the behaviour of an individual member of a cartel has caused 
damage to customers. In some instances, at least, it may be argued that the price in 
the industry would have remained far above the competitive level even if one 
individual firm had not participated in the cartel. Suppose for the purpose of 
illustration that a particular firm’s decision to join the cartel had not affected the cartel 
price. A strict application of the “but-for” criterion for that individual firm might lead 
one to the conclusion that the firm’s actions caused no damage, as the cartel price 
would have stayed the same, even if this firm would not have contributed to the 
cartel.  However, in at least some cases cartels have been alleged to consist of a 
large number of small firms40. If one considered whether any individual firm’s 
behaviour caused the damage to customers, one might arrive to the conclusion that 
no firm should be held responsible.  
In order to avoid this problem, various correctives to the test have been 
proposed, the NESS (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set of conditions) test being 
one of them. The NESS test enables the inclusion of conditions that contributed to 
the result or were a factor in the occurrence of the result, thus dealing with the 
under-inclusiveness of the “but-for” test. This is achieved with the introduction in the 
analysis of the concept of a sufficient set of conditions necessary for the occurrence 
of an event (the damage), which does not require the establishment of a direct link 
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between a specific condition and a consequent result, as this is the case with the 
necessity requirement in the “but-for” test. Hence, although each of the individual 
components of the set would not be sufficient for producing the specific damage, if it 
forms part of set of conditions that would be sufficient for the occurrence of the 
damage, it would be deemed to have a causal character. By introducing the concept 
of the set of sufficient conditions, the NESS test dissociates necessity from 
sufficiency. The existence of an alternative necessary condition, part of the specific 
set of sufficient conditions, does not deny the finding of causation, as all necessary 
elements of that sufficient set of conditions would be deemed to constitute the cause. 
Suppose that any two of three colluding firms could have colluded and the result 
would have been a high price level.  A strict application of the ‘but-for’ or ‘strong 
necessity test’ might conclude that the behaviour of any one firm, say firm 1, was not 
necessary for the result that a cartel led to high prices and so causation is not 
established. But for the actions of firm 1, firms 2 and 3 would have colluded anyway 
and this would have led to cartel prices. Of course the same could be said for any 
individual participant in the cartel. NESS on the other hand considers a firm’s 
behaviour to be a cause if it is a necessary element of (or condition contributing to) 
some set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the 
cartel. Here there is a set of antecedent conditions, that involving the behaviour of 
firms 1 and 2 coordinating prices, where firm 1’s behaviour is a necessary element of 
the conditions sufficient to cause customers to pay cartel prices. 
Yet, this test may also lead to a problem of over-inclusiveness in the presence of 
multiple simultaneous sufficient causes that may constitute competing alternatives, 
rather than cumulative ones, for the occurrence of the damage. Assume that an 
excluded or marginalised undertaking suffered losses of market share and thus 
profits, because of the conduct/strategy of a dominant undertaking in a relevant 
market. Some of this conduct was found to constitute an exclusionary abuse under 
Article 102 TFEU, while some other parts of this strategy were found compatible with 
Article 102 TFEU, because of the superior efficiency of the undertaking41. It will be 
important in this case to distinguish the harm that was caused by the conduct found 
illegal, and the losses caused by the conduct that was found legal. For instance the 
loss of market share may not constitute, as such, harm caused by the illegal 
conduct, but may be the result of legal conduct. This is impractical, at least at the 
step of establishing causation (if this is viewed independently from that of the 
quantification of harm). The application of the NESS test may hence lead to over-
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inclusiveness as the loss will be imputed entirely to the conduct found illegal, both 
causes being simultaneously sufficient for the occurrence of the damage. A way out, 
for the NESS test, would be to consider that the victim has suffered no loss if their 
lost market share would have occurred in any event, as a result of the conduct found 
legal, the illegal conduct being not causative of a loss42. 
 
b. Generalizing or generalist theories of causation: the theory of adequate cause 
 
Moore explains that generalist theories of causation “seek to reduce that 
relation between state of affairs tokens, to some law-based relation between state of 
affairs types”43. The theory of adequate cause constitutes the archetype of a 
generalizing theory of causation in fact, as it focuses on the condition or conditions 
that would objectively be of the nature to produce the type of damage examined, not 
necessarily the specific damage or event. The theory of adequate cause presents 
close characteristics to scientific theories of causation, in the sense that it puts 
emphasis on the regularity of the occurrence of types of events in order to infer from 
this a causal generalization implemented in the specific case examined. This 
involves the description of a class of events whose probability must be shown to 
have significantly increased by the condition/conduct in question. The condition may 
be described either in the light of what the actor knew at the time of the act, or in light 
of the knowledge of a “prudent man”, or, finally, by reference to “what was or has 
become known otherwise, for example, circumstances existing at the time of the […] 
act which have been discovered through the subsequent course of events”44.  
The “scope of the rule” doctrine often complements the analysis of probabilities, 
providing some limits to the extent to which conditions are considered as the 
adequate cause. This is an element of causation in law, although it also plays an 
important role in determining adequate cause in the context of causation in fact. 
Courts may refer to the purpose of the rule violated (“Normzweck”), determined 
according to its scope (“Schutzbereich”), in order to focus their inquiry only on those 
conditions that relate directly to the purpose of the rule breached45. This provides 
judges with some discretion over the interpretation of the scope of the rule and 
consequently the conditions to take into account. It also enables them to focus the 
analysis only on the risks that the legal system expects the actors not to bear for 
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themselves. Depending on how important the analysis of the “scope of the rule” 
doctrine is in the process of determining causation in fact, one may conclude that the 
causation in fact inquiry may be disposed of in certain circumstances. 
 
2. Criticisms to a strict distinction between cause in fact and legal causation (or 
responsibility) 
 
As it transpires from the above discussion, it is difficult to separate issues of fact 
from issues of legal policy in the determination of causation in fact. The operation of 
the principle of equivalence of conditions or sine qua non condition, frequently used 
to determine causation in fact, does not conclude the causation in fact inquiry. In 
addition, it becomes important to examine the presence of the causal connection 
required by the relevant legal rule. This is an issue that is partly influenced by factors 
derived from common sense notions of causation (thus, a factual matter), and partly 
by “scope rules”, that is, the question of whether, as a matter of policy, the law ought 
in this case to enlarge or restrict liability46. Hence, one should distinguish between 
causal limitations that are common in all areas of law and limitations resulting out of 
“scope rules”, which may vary in each area of law according to the policy issues that 
are considered relevant47.  
It follows from the above that there are three steps to be distinguished in the 
causal inquiry: the first step will attempt to identify factual causation, for instance the 
conditions but for which the damage will not have occurred (conditions sine qua 
non). The second step will attempt to identify further causal connections not 
identified by the sine qua non test, based on “common sense principles”, common to 
all areas of law. For instance, the intervention of a deliberate voluntary human act or 
abnormal coincidence will “break the chain of the causal connection”, even if the 
subsequent events would not have occurred but for the examined conduct. The third 
step will engage with policy reasons and will include scope limitations “truncating 
liability more narrowly” than that produced by mere satisfaction of a designated 
causal requirement48.  
Although issues relating to cause in fact (the explanatory function of causation) 
and issues relating to legal responsibility (the attributive function of causation) are 
clearly separated49, the “practical interests” of the decision-maker and the context in 
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which causation should be identified exercise some influence, to a certain extent, on 
the operation of the natural causal inquiry (causation in fact)50. If one is to distinguish 
causes from “mere circumstances or conditions”, the practical interests and the 
purpose of the person making the causal statement may influence the decision to 
treat as cause an event or a deliberate human intervention that makes a difference 
to the normal course of events which accounts for the difference in outcome51. In the 
absence of a universally applicable legal test of causation, the law may employ 
different tests in different circumstances, indicating that cause in fact can never be a 
purely factual issue52. Furthermore, issues of relevance are never absent from a 
cause in fact inquiry, although not as explicitly as with the cause in law inquiry. One 
has always to identify the causal facts out of the non-causal ones (mere conditions). 
In practice, the starting point of causal inquiries is often reversed: we start from what 
is thought to constitute the causally relevant events, before asking whether these 
amount to causes in fact53. Finally, causation in law depends also on common sense 
principles, such as the ability of the agent to reasonably foresee the damage, which 
is also linked to the scope of the duty of care the agent has towards the victim, 
hence a mixed facts and law/policy issue.  
Does this mean that the causation in fact and causation in law inquiries should be 
merged? It is important here to note that the “practical interests” of the inquiry, 
occasionally taken into account in the causation in fact inquiry, remain distinct from 
issues of justice, efficiency and, more generally, policy, which enter the picture only 
when examining the attributive function of legal causation (responsibility), that is, 
choosing “the” responsible cause. This is not a purely causal inquiry but a policy 
inquiry dealing with issues of moral and legal responsibility54. An event may be a 
cause of the injury (actual causation/causation in fact) but not “the” responsible 
cause, if the injury would have occurred anyway as a result of non-responsible 
conditions or other moral, economic, legal arguments weighing against liability55. The 
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principal aim of causation in law is to limit liability, once a causal relation has been 
identified. 
The distinction between natural causation (causation in fact) and responsibility 
(causation in law) implies that the causal inquiry takes a factual, empirical approach 
and should almost always be kept separate from policy issues. However, while 
recognizing the importance of such distinction for conceptual clarity purposes, 
implementing it constitutes a more complex endeavour, as in reality the law retains a 
central role in determining causation in fact and, in particular, which natural 
causation test is to be applied, among the many put forward56. In addition, the form 
of the causal requirement becomes an issue of policy as long as cause may be 
conceived narrowly, as referring to a voluntary act of doing harm or, more broadly, 
as covering an unintentional conduct of “occasioning harm”, or, in other words, an 
act providing the opportunity or means necessary for harm to occur. Rules 
concerning the existence of presumptions or the allocation of the burden of proof 
may also introduce policy considerations in the assessment of causation in fact, 
eventually operating as alternatives to it (ersatz to factual causation)57. The analysis 
of the way tort law systems deal with situations of causal uncertainty, which are quite 
frequent in damages claims for competition law infringements, shows the strong 
interplay of causation in fact and causation in law (responsibility) in this context. 
 
III. Causal uncertainty and actions for competition law damages: a 
comparative perspective 
 
Causal uncertainty may take different forms. It may relate to a situation in which 
the conduct of multiple tortfeasors may have contributed to the realization of the 
damage, hence making attribution of the damage suffered to the conduct of a 
specific defendant particularly difficult (situations of preemptive and duplicative 
cause). For instance, according to the cumulative effect doctrine of the Court of 
Justice in Delimitis, a combination of tying/exclusive purchasing agreements might 
infringe Article 101 TFEU if it would be difficult for competing suppliers to enter the 
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market because of the cumulative effects of the networks of agreements by different 
suppliers in the market (the foreclosure effect of all the networks of agreements) and 
the supplier network to which the agreement under consideration formed part had a 
significant contribution to the foreclosure effect (contribution of the specific network 
of agreements to the foreclosure effect)58. The collective dimension of antitrust 
liability in this context does not avoid the necessary examination at the stage of the 
attribution of the damage the causal relation between a specific conduct by one of 
the multiple tortfeasors and the damage suffered. A second form of uncertainty may 
relate to the lack of clear evidence on the causal link between the conduct of a 
defendant and the damage suffered by the claimant, or on the lack of scientific 
consensus on the inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. The relative 
uncertainty which may characterize a complex causal inquiry, as that usually 
required in the context of competition law enforcement, has led legal doctrine to 
develop auxiliary methods of establishing legal causation, without proceeding to an 
in depth analysis of factual causation, according to the theories mentioned above.  
 
A. Five ways to deal with situations of causal uncertainty 
 
Causal uncertainty constitutes a feature of tort litigation, in particular following the 
development of mass tort litigation and the increasing reliance on scientific evidence 
in damages cases59. The application of the traditional but-for or sine qua non causal 
test in these circumstances, coupled with the prevailing evidentiary rules on the 
standard of proof may lead to a perceived failure of tort law to provide compensation 
to victims of mass torts (under-compensation), where the court determines that the 
required standard of proof was not met, or to over-compensation, should the court 
decide, despite causal uncertainty, that the required standard of proof is met and that 
causation has been established60. In view of the negative effects of such an all-or-
nothing approach to corrective justice and deterrence (at least in most 
circumstances), legal systems have opted for different strategies in order to respond 
to situations of causal uncertainty. The sources of causal uncertainty may be 
multiple: broadly defined, it may be evidential, when there is uncertainty over the 
facts, or scientific, when there is uncertainty over the inferences that should be 
drawn out of the facts on the basis of the scientific method (as opposed to just 
common sense). 
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Legal systems may select to address causal uncertainty as an issue (i) of factual 
causation, (ii) relating to causation in law (responsibility), (iii) that requires specific 
procedural rules, (iv) that requires a public law solution, or (v) to be ignored 
altogether.  
For instance, with regard to the first approach, one may decide to attribute 
responsibility for a specific harm, according to the probability that the specific tortious 
activity was a factual cause of it61. This may lead the legal system to accept “causal 
proportional liability”, which is defined as “the tort liability imposed on D for harm 
suffered by P, for part of it, or for harm that P may suffer, according to the causal 
probability that D’s tortious conduct may have caused the harm or caused part of it 
or may cause harm in the future”62. Systems of causal proportional liability may take 
different forms, one of which constitutes the well-known doctrine of loss of a chance 
chance’ (or ‘loss of opportunity’ in the jargon of the newly adopted Damages Directive). 
With regard to the second approach, which is often used in situations of multiple 
tortfeasors, the legal system may opt, causal uncertainty notwithstanding, to 
recognize the existence of the causal link and hence the liability of the multiple 
tortfeasors and then to provide rules that apportion liability among the multiple 
tortfeasors (contribution or recourse claims) or between the defendants and the 
claimants (contributory negligence). As it is rightly explained in a recent comparative 
study by the European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law, these rules differ from 
causal proportional liability as “they apportion harm after it has been established by 
the required burden and standard of proof that the multiple tortfeasors or [the 
claimant] were a factual cause of the same share (or all) of the [claimant’s] harm”63. 
For this reason, joint (or solidary64) and several liability of multiple tortfeasors in 
competition law infringements. 
The third approach maintains the traditional all or nothing approach, but shifts the 
burden of proof from the claimant to the defendant, and is accompanied by solidary 
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liability65, the objective being to ease the burden of proof for the party that was the 
alleged victim of the infringement, essentially for fairness reasons66. 
The fourth approach recognizes that the usual mechanisms of tort law may not 
provide adequate compensation to those harmed in situations of causal uncertainty 
and advances an administrative governance solution that would substitute “public 
law sanctions (taxes, fines or fund schemes) for tort liability”, the collected money 
being used “to repair [the claimants’] harm, on a collective or individual basis, and to 
help prevent such harms in the future67. A functional equivalent consists in bypassing 
“the causal relation problem” and allowing “class or representative claims in which 
the claimants are not required to establish the individual harm caused by each 
[defendant] to each claimant but rather the overall harm caused to the [claimants] as 
a group”, the awarded amount being distributed among the claimants68. For instance, 
this will involve class actions or representative actions, or even a public 
compensation scheme to compensate those injured by the public enforcement 
activities of the competition authority. 
Ignoring the problem will lead to over-compensation or under-compensation, 
depending on the domestic evidence rules on the standard of proof. The interaction 
of the standard of proof and the strategy adopted by each legal system should not be 
under-estimated and constitutes in most cases the main reason justifying the choice 
made69. 
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We will focus here on the different expressions of causal proportional liability, 
such as the doctrine of the loss of chance, market share liability, and liability 
according to the contribution of the tortious conduct to the risk. 
The primary purpose of the doctrine of the loss of chance, as is the case for other 
forms of causal proportional liability, is to strengthen the victim’s position in situations 
of causal uncertainty, in which it is difficult for the claimant to prove the existence of 
a causal link between the claimant’s conduct and the damage. 
In some civil legal systems70, in particular in France, the doctrine of loss of 
chance constitutes a specific and autonomous type of damage71, with reference to 
the final damage, in view of the open and general nature of tortious liability72. The 
concept is employed when the occurrence of the damage is certain, and had a 
particular condition or hypothetical outcome be realized. One may distinguish this 
“second degree” or “relative” certainty as to the loss of a chance, from the situation 
of hypothetical damage, which it is not clear will be compensated under French law, 
in view of the requirement of certainty and the high standard of proof the claimant 
needs to overcome. It is however necessary that the lost chance is “deemed as real 
and serious”73. This requires the claimant to establish “the mere probability of 
materialization of the result that the chance offered”74. The compensation of the 
victim may also be partial, which contrasts with the all-or-nothing approach of the 
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usual causation in fact requirement with regard to the award of the damage. This 
may potentially dispose of the requirement of causal link altogether as the plaintiff 
may be granted partial compensation equivalent to the fraction of the value or the 
advantage denied as a result of the loss of chance. The compensation is awarded by 
calculating the advantage expected by the victim, if the condition or hypothetical 
outcome had been realized, had the probability that this hypothetical outcome be 
realized75. The concept thus offers the judge the opportunity to engage in the 
assessment of probabilities for the chance or opportunity to be realized, based on 
factors or causal presumptions that are not linked to the specific individual causal 
link between the harmful conduct and the damage. Compensation is thus not related 
to evidence of an individual causal link between the harm and the conduct, but 
requires partial compensation of all parties affected by the loss of the 
opportunity/chance, once the harmful conduct has been identified, on the basis of 
how likely/probable the realization of this opportunity/chance was)76. 
One may also refer to “market share liability” as another situation of causal 
uncertainty dealt with by causal proportional liability. In US law, the judge may award 
compensation by reference to the market shares of the entities that have engaged in 
the harmful conduct, thus linking the market share of each entity to the risk the 
harmful conduct caused to the affected party and consequently to the amount of the 
damage to be awarded77.  
Alternatively, causal proportional liability maybe based “on the ex ante risk 
created by [a defendant], rather than an ex post assessment of the probability of 
having caused a specific claimant’s harm”78. Consequently, a duty of reparation may 
be imposed to those responsible for the loss of chance, in accordance with the risk 
their conduct/activities created to the loss of that opportunity.  
Causal presumptions or evidential short-cuts constitute an alternative tool to 
dispose of difficult factual causation issues. The reversal of the burden of proof may 
also constitute an additional ersatz of causation in fact. Inevitably, principles of public 
policy exercise significant influence in the design of these causal presumptions, 
which may lead to inferences of a causal link or a reversal of the burden of proof to 
the defendant, relieving the claimants of any real obligation to show a factual causal 
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connection between a conduct and a harm or loss suffered. In particular, causal 
presumptions avoid the hurdle of establishing a direct causal link between the 
conduct of the defendant and a hypothetical but probable loss. Causal presumptions 
may ultimately force the defendant to act as an insurer providing compensation to all 
members of a class of claimants that has suffered losses, even in the presence of 
only a tenuous relationship with its conduct. The limited institutional competence of 
judges argues against such presumptions being established by the judiciary, 
although a significant experience with a certain type of cases and evidence may lead 
the judiciary, in specific circumstances, to develop inferences of causation. The 
legislator may nevertheless take the initiative to establish causal presumptions in 
order to facilitate proof for certain categories of claimants. Inevitably, policy 
considerations and distributive justice concerns, in particular, may explain the choice 
for such an approach.  
 
B. Towards the development of EU causation rules for competition law based 
actions for damages? 
 
The Ashurst study on the conditions of claims for damages acknowledged that 
“the test of causation is approached in very different ways in the Member States”79. 
Indeed, a cursory view of the different general tort law regimes of the most 
significant, in terms of the number of damages actions, EU Member States show 
important differences as to the choice of causation in fact tests and the interaction 
between causation in fact and the scope of liability rules (causation in law) (1). More 
importantly, the implementation so far of causation principles in damages actions for 
the infringement of competition law in various EU Member States illustrates that strict 
causation requirements, or more accurately the perception that causation 
requirements constitute an important hurdle, may limit the opportunities of certain 
categories of claimants to bring forward their claims, thus undermining the 
effectiveness of the EU remedy of damages for competition law infringements (2). 
This has led to some effort at the EU level to facilitate the position of certain 
categories of claimants (3). We conclude this section with a discussion of different 
options for the definition of causation (4) 
 
1. A comparative analysis of causation rules in the European Union: England 
and Wales, Germany and France 
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A comparative analysis of causation rules in the various tort law legal systems of 
the EU Member states illustrates the great variety of approaches followed, first with 
regard to the distinction and the subsequently the interaction between causation in 
fact and the scope of liability (or causation in law) and, second, with regard to the 
approach followed with regard to situations of causal uncertainty. 
 
a. England and Wales 
 
English (and Welsh) law divides the assessment of causation into two steps: first 
determining causation in fact and, second, determining causation in law or legal 
cause80.  
With regard to causation in law, English law proceeds with a number of specific 
enactments that impose a duty of care, if that was the legislative intention, or more 
generally under the general tort of negligence. The court determines whether, in the 
particular circumstances of the case, the defendant owed a duty of care to the 
claimant, in view of the scope of protection afforded by the statutory duty breached. 
A duty of care is generally found to exist if the economic injury to the claimant was 
foreseeable, there is a relation of proximity between the claimant and the defendant 
and it would be “fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care upon the 
defendant”81. The concept of causation in law aims to distinguish those causes to which the 
law assigns responsibility. Under common law, cause in law is found when the event is not 
too ‘remote’ from the defendant’s wrongful conduct (e.g. a free, deliberate, informed action 
normally breaks the chain of causation between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s 
injury). Remoteness involves the likelihood of the harm (hence a test implicitly based on 
probabilities, excluding from compensation an improbable loss, that is, damage that a 
reasonable person could not have foreseen), its gravity, or broader policy questions, such as 
fairness, the insurability of the harm, or ensuring efficient loss shifting or spreading through 
the implementation of the least cost avoidance principle or the development of standards 
reflecting social values and concerns with regard to the allocation of risks and 
responsibilities. Policy or normative considerations may also be taken into account in 
the course of establishing if there is a duty of care. For instance, with regard to the 
tort of breach of statutory duty, English courts examine whether the harm suffered by 
the claimant relates to the statutory duty breached82. However, this does not go as 
far as incorporating in English law the “scope of the rule” doctrine that would have 
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required an elaborate inquiry on the boundaries of the scope of protection and the 
interests safeguarded by the specific statutory duty breached.  
With regard to causation in fact, the English courts employ the “but for test”83. 
The claimant must show that it is more likely than not that the damage would not 
have occurred “but for” the defendant’s breach of duty. As it is put by Clerk and 
Lindsell on Torts, referred to by the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) in 2 Travel 
Group:  
“(t)he first step in establishing causation is to eliminate irrelevant causes, and this 
is the purpose of the “but for” test. The courts are concerned, not to identify all of 
the possible causes of a particular incident, but with the effective cause of the 
resulting damage in order to assign responsibility for that damage. The “but for” 
test asks: would the damage of which the claimant complains have occurred “but 
for” the negligence (or other wrongdoing) of the defendant? Or to put it more 
accurately, can the claimant adduce evidence to show that it is more likely than 
not, more than 50 per cent probable, that “but for” the defendant’s wrongdoing 
the relevant damage would not have occurred. In other words, if the damage 
would have occurred in any event the defendant’s conduct is not a “but for” 
cause.”84 
However, the “but-for” test was modified, or some would argue ignored, in certain 
cases of causal uncertainty, either because the claimant’s injury was provoked by 
the conduct of multiple indeterminate defendants, or because of a genuine scientific 
uncertainty as to the inferences that may be drawn from the factual record. English 
law has provided a choice of a variety of instruments from those listed above with 
regard to situations of causal uncertainty. 
In situations of “indeterminate cause”, when the individual responsible for the 
harm cannot be identified, the courts have opted for an ersatz of causation in fact, 
the reversal of the burden of proof, so that each of the defendants has to show that 
his conduct did not produce the harm85. In the absence of such proof, both 
tortfeasors may be held liable. This solution, however, “only works in English law if 
the probabilities are equally split between two defendants”, but does not do so “if 
there are more than two defendants, and the probability that each has caused the 
harm is less than even”86. In these cases, maintaining the but-for-test, coupled with a 
reversal of the burden of proof, would not be sufficient to establish causation. 
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The but-for test was also found inoperable in situations where the application of 
the test would have led to the conclusion that each of the defendants’ conduct could 
have caused the harm, each of the defendants being equally to blame for the 
claimant’s loss. English courts have found multiple tortfeasors to be liable in solidum 
(jointly and severally liable), each of them being potentially responsible for the full 
amount of the loss, even if such solution cannot be reconciled with a strict 
application of the but-for test, thus choosing to address the issue of proportional 
liability when deciding the apportionment/contribution of the harm or the extent of 
contributory negligence (hence at the redress stage), rather than at the level of 
causation in fact (which is presumed to have been established)87. 
Situations of genuine scientific uncertainty were dealt by the introduction of an 
exception to the application of but-for test in Fairchild88, an exception “to the ordinary 
application of principles of causation”, and narrowly confined to “situations of 
scientific, as opposed to merely evidential, uncertainty, as to the cause of the 
condition, and the fact that the condition resulted from the same (or at least similar 
risks) to which the claimant was exposed”89. This mesothelioma-related diseases tort 
case law has accepted the development of “weaker” or broader causal link tests, for 
cases presenting an important evidential uncertainty, for instance because of 
uncertainty in the available scientific evidence on the existence of a causal link when 
multiple causal factors are at play. Causation in fact was therefore found where the 
defendant in breach of the statutory duty materially increased the risk of the claimant 
suffering a particular kind of loss90 or simply because the defendant increased the 
probability of harm which that statutory duty aimed to avoid91. Hence, it is possible to 
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establish causation in fact, by virtue of a material increase in risk in the presence of 
an evidential impossibility to prove the causal link on the balance of probabilities92.  
The finding of such liability leads to the question of the extent of the liability of the 
defendants (and/or the contributory negligence of the claimant), the choice being 
between a rule that would have found them joint and severally liable for the full 
amount of the damage (thus choosing to address the issue at the stage of the 
apportionment of damages to the harm/redress stage, the claimant being able to 
seek compensation in full from any the solidary tortfeasors) and a rule that would 
have found them liable for only a proportionate share reflecting their contribution to 
the total risk (hence the claimant should seek compensation from each party in 
relation to the harm that party caused)93. Although these two doctrines are 
considered in some contexts interchangeable as methods to resolve causal 
uncertainty, as we have explained above, they constitute two genuinely different 
approaches to situations of scientific uncertainty and impose different burdens on the 
claimant and defendants. The English courts finally chose the route of the 
proportionate liability94. They also prefer to risk unfairness to the claimants by 
reversing the burden of proof to the defendant, if the claimant can show a material 
increase in risk, rather than taking the view that the increase of the risk constitutes 
the damage itself, which may have changed the substantive law’s notion of damage, 
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simply because of an evidentiary difficulty95. For all these cases where there is 
“inherent uncertainty” as to the proof that the defendant’s wrongful conduct caused 
the claimant’s loss, because of the above evidentiary difficulties, but where it is 
possible to estimate the chance that the defendant caused the loss, damages are 
calculated by multiplying the magnitude of the chance lost, which can be estimated, 
by the total loss suffered. As Steel explains, the doctrine “is better thought as 
creating proportionate liability in proportion to the chance that the defendant has 
caused” the harm: “(d)amages are for the chance of causation, not causation of a 
lost chance”96. Although the doctrine of loss of a chance is not properly adopted in 
English law with regard to cases of personal injury, loss of a chance awards have 
been accepted in the context of compensation actions for pure economic loss97. As 
to the “market share liability” option, this has not yet been accepted by English 
courts98. With regard to causal uncertainty as to future harm, English law 
distinguishes between “cases in which it is uncertain whether the [claimant] will 
suffer any harm at all and cases in which harm has already been caused but the 
scope of the harm (or the development of a new harm) in the future is unknown”99. 
While the first category does not give rise to causation and thus damages are not 
awarded, the second is a matter usually addressed at the stage of the quantification 
of damages100. 
Moving to concrete competition law examples, in Albion Water, the UK 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (hereinafter, CAT) examined a follow on claim for 
damages brought by a water company, Albion Water, against the defendant utility 
company, Dŵr Cymru, relying on the finding of the CAT that the defendant had 
                                                          
95
 Trigger BAI (Run off) v. Durham [2012] UKSC 14, Lord Mance noting that “there is no magic about 
concepts such as causation or causal requirements, wherever they appear. They have the meanings 
assigned to them and understood in ordinary usage in their context”. He further concluded (para. 73-
74) that “it is not in any event accurate to treat the liability as being either solely or strictly for the risk” 
and that “(t)he risk is no more than an element or condition necessary to establish liability”. 
96
 Sandy Steel, Rationalising Loss of a Chance in Tort, in Stephen GA Pitel, Jason W Neyers and 
Erika Chamberlain (eds.) Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (Hart Pub. 2013), 242. 
97
 Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602. K. Oliphant, Causal 
Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in England and Wales, in I. Gilead, M.D. Green & B.A. Koch  
(eds.), Proportional Liability: Analytical and Comparative Perspectives (De Gruyter, 2013), 121-139, 
131, notes that “(a)s the chance has economic value, it is clear that its loss itself constitutes damage” 
but cautions that “it is only exceptional that pure economic loss is recoverable”. The author noted the 
“evident tension” of rejecting the loss of a chance doctrine, while accepting the weaker causation in 
fact standard of material contribution to risk. 
98
 K. Oliphant, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in England and Wales, in I. Gilead, M.D. 
Green & B.A. Koch  (eds.), Proportional Liability: Analytical and Comparative Perspectives (De 
Gruyter, 2013), 121-139, 128-129. 
99
 K. Oliphant, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in England and Wales, in I. Gilead, M.D. 
Green & B.A. Koch  (eds.), Proportional Liability: Analytical and Comparative Perspectives (De 
Gruyter, 2013), 121-139, 126. 
100
 . Oliphant, Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability in England and Wales, in I. Gilead, M.D. 
Green & B.A. Koch  (eds.), Proportional Liability: Analytical and Comparative Perspectives (De 
Gruyter, 2013), 121-139, 126. 
29 
 
engaged to an abuse of a dominant position by adopting the practices of margin 
squeeze and charging excessive prices101. The CAT examined the issues of 
causation and quantum. Albion was asserting that if it had been offered a reasonable 
price for common carriage by Dŵr Cymru it would have accepted that offer and thus 
would have been able to make more money on its supply of water to some of its 
existing customers and could have also bid to supply others. The CAT thus 
proceeded by comparing the money that Albion would have made in the 
counterfactual world (but for the infringement) with the money it in fact made from 
the supply to existing customers in order to see if it has suffered any loss.  
The CAT constructed the counterfactual cautiously by assuming that the 
defendant would not have engaged in illegal conduct and would have negotiated a 
reasonable agreement, in view of the possibility of the regulator, OFWAT, to 
intervene and apply concurrently competition law as well as the Water Industry Act. 
Although the CAT recognized that there is a range of lawful access prices that Dŵr 
Cymru could have offered, the CAT took the middle of that range, on the assumption 
that the defendant would have offered a reasonable access price rather than the 
highest price it would lawfully have charged102. It also held that on balance of 
probabilities Albion would have agreed to this rate. When examining the other costs 
of supply of Albion in the counterfactual world the CAT took care to evaluate the 
commercial reality of the parties’ relative positions and their bargaining power, as 
well as overall industry practice. 
The case presents a particular interest in view of the analysis by the CAT of the 
loss of the opportunity that Albion would have had in the counterfactual world to bid 
for a contract to supply water to a new customer, which had invited Albion to tender. 
Albion was alleging that the defendant’s abusive behavior effectively deprived it of 
that opportunity, as Albion was obliged to focus its very limited resources on the 
competition case and simply did not have the resources to devote to pursuing other 
business opportunities103. The CAT analyzed this as a loss of chance claim. The 
CAT referred to the Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons case law of the 
Court of appeal in which Stuart-Smith LJ highlighting the distinction between 
causation and quantification of damages by the different function probability 
judgments played in each context: 
 “[…] What has to be proved to establish a causal link between the negligence of 
the defendants and the loss sustained by the plaintiffs depends in the first 
instance on whether the negligence consists in some positive act or misfeasance, 
or an omission or non-feasance. In the former case, the question of causation is 
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one of historical fact. […] Once established on the balance of probability, that fact 
is taken as true and the plaintiff recovers his damage in full. There is no discount 
because the judge considers that the balance is only just tipped in favour of the 
plaintiff; and the plaintiff gets nothing if he fails to establish that it is more likely 
than not that the accident resulted in the injury.  
Questions of quantification of the plaintiff’s loss, however, may depend upon 
future uncertain events. […] It is trite law that these questions are not decided on 
a balance of probability, but rather on the court's assessment, often expressed in 
percentage terms, of the risk eventuating or the prospect of promotion, which, it 
should be noted, depends in part at least on the hypothetical acts of a third 
party104.  
The Court of appeal also noted that if the plaintiff’s loss depends on the 
hypothetical action of a third party, either in addition to action by the plaintiff or 
independently, the plaintiff may succeed provided that he shows on the balance 
of probabilities there is a substantial chance, rather than a speculative one. The 
evaluation of the substantial chance is an issue relating to the quantification of 
damages, the quantum being in this case the relevant percentage of the total 
profit that would have been made if Albion had indeed won the business. The 
assessment of the chance in the context of quantification is done in a “range lying 
somewhere between something that just qualifies as real or substantial on the 
one hand and near certainty on the other”105. 
The CAT found in this case that it would have been highly likely for Albion to 
win this contract, although not as high as certain or near certain and reduced 
consequently Albion’s damages for its lost opportunity by one third (33%).  
Causation was also thoroughly examined in Cardiff Bus, a case involving a follow 
on claim for damages, relying on an OFT decision finding that a bus company, 
Cardiff Bus, had abused its dominant position by engaging in exclusionary practices 
(predatory conduct through the launching of loss-making bus services, the so called 
“White Services” on top of their regular liveried service) against a rival bus company, 
2 Travel, and leading it to liquidation106. The damages claimed by 2 Travel were 
substantial and covered lost profits, loss of a capital asset, loss of a commercial 
opportunity, wasted staff and management time and the costs relating to Travel 2 
liquidation.  
The defendant, Cardiff Bus, raised the issue of factual causation and advanced a 
strict but-for test that would have compared the losses in the real world with those in 
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the but-for world, but only to the extent that these losses would not have occurred in 
the but-for world scenario. Cardiff Bus’ argument was that in any case 2 Travel 
would have gone bankrupt, in view of its weak financial position and its 
mismanagement, hence the costs involved by 2 Travel’s liquidation would also have 
been incurred in the “but-for” world scenario. 2 Travel was advancing a broader 
causation test, arguing that it should focus instead on the factors that have 
contributed to the damage, in this case 2 Travel’s exit from the market. Hence, if 
Cardiff Bus’ predatory conduct was a contributing factor to its exit from the market, 
that would be a sufficient finding upon which to infer causation. The nature of the 
behavior (its predatory character) and the intent of Cardiff Bus to cause the “type” of 
damage actually incurred, would be sufficient elements, according to 2 Travel, for the 
finding of causation. Without employing explicitly such terminology, 2 Travel was 
putting forward reasoning, in terms of probabilities, that Cardiff’s Bus predatory 
conduct had caused the damage. 
The CAT rejected the broader view of causation advanced by 2 Travel, finding it 
“vague”. It also held that intention alone cannot be said to be causative, in particular 
if the defendant has not taken any effective steps to cause such harm. The CAT 
seems to have relied on a clear distinction between factual causation and causation 
in law, normative aspects, such as the protective scope of competition law, 
exercising no influence on the assessment of causation in fact. The anticompetitive 
intent of Cardiff Bus, which could have been a factor considered in the analysis of 
the scope of the rule, was therefore found to be irrelevant in the analysis of the 
factual causation step. That said, the CAT engaged in a thorough but cautious 
analysis of the relevant counter-factual scenario, in particular exploring what 2 
Travel’s position would have been, had the “White Services” never operated. For 
example, with relation to the claim of a causative link between the decline of 2 
Travel’s bus services and the infringement, the CAT found, on the balance of 
probabilities, that this falling off was due to 2 Travel’s “basic operational failings with 
its too hasty expansion of services” and not the infringement107. Also, with regard to 
loss of passengers and diversion of passenger revenue, the CAT engaged in a 
considerate analysis of the other options that passengers of “White Services” 
disposed and did not assume that all these passengers would have made the choice 
of 2 Travel’s bus service. The Tribunal also opted for a frequency-based allocation of 
passengers, in view of the importance the frequency of service had for consumers, 
adequately adjusted with a number of other factors. 
 
b. Germany 
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In German tort law, the requirement of causation derives from the general part of 
the law of obligations relating to the general theory of the reparation of damage108. 
As in English law, the causal inquiry is bifurcated between a factual phase 
(“Kausalität im natürlichen Sinne” or natural causation) and a more normative/policy 
oriented one (“Kausalität im rechtlichen Sinne” or causation in the legal sense)109.  
With regard to the normative dimension, a distinction is made between causation 
giving rise to the violation of a protected interest or “causation as a foundation of 
liability” (“Haftungsbegrüdende Kausalität”), which links the conduct of the defendant 
and the infringement of a protected interest, and “causation as a determinant of the 
scope of liability” (Haftungsausfüllende Kausalität), which relates to the issue of the 
extent of damage110. While the first must be proved by the plaintiff, the second can 
be assessed by the court on the basis of available evidence111.  
The factual dimension of the causal inquiry in German tort law requires claimants 
to demonstrate the existence of an adequate causal nexus between the conduct (an 
act or an omission) and the damage. This is undertaken under the equivalence of 
conditions test (the condition-sine-qua-non or but-for test)112. This is also 
complemented with the more generalizing theory of adequate cause 
(“Adäquanztheorie”). The theory has received different interpretation by German 
legal scholarship, some authors insisting on the idea that a cause of an ultimate 
event is the factor that departs from the ordinary course of events113, while others 
have relied on a probabilistic view of causation arguing that a fact should be 
considered as the adequate cause of the damage, if and only if, it has significantly 
increased the objective probability114 of the occurrence of the damage115. According 
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to the formulations usually adopted by German courts, an event is the adequate 
cause of a particular result, “if (it) general increases, in a significant way, the 
objective probability of a result of the kind which occurred116” or, alternatively, the 
event would have been considered as an adequate cause of the damage, “if it could 
engender the damage in question only under particularly unique, improbable 
circumstances which would have been disregarded had events followed their usual 
course”117, “these probabilities being assessed from the point of view of an “optimal 
observer” which knows all the circumstances surrounding the injurious event which 
could be known at the time of that event and is furthermore equipped with the 
general experience of mankind”118. Hence, German law adopts the generalizing 
theory of adequate cause, essentially based on probabilities.  
German legal scholarship and the courts, have also developed the concept of the 
“scope of the rule” (”Schutzzweck der Norm”) in order to delimit the damages that 
can be recovered. The rule postulates that “an obligation to make reparation will only 
arise, if the damage claimed, according to its type and its origin, stems from a sphere 
of danger which the infringed norm was enacted to protect against”119. The theory 
inevitably introduces normative and policy considerations in the assessment of 
causation in fact, thus conflating with “causation as a foundation of liability” 
(“Haftungsbegrüdende Kausalität”), which, as we have previously highlighted, forms 
part of the normative phase of the causal inquiry. The concept offers the necessary 
degree of flexibility to take into account the interests protected by the norm and the 
sphere of risks each of them should be expected to bear.  
With regard to causal uncertainty arising out of several tortfeasors causing the 
same damage, German law prefers the solution of the solidary liability of all 
defendants, as “it is thought that it should not be the victim’s risk to prove who 
caused which part of the damage”120. Where one of the several liable tortfeasors 
compensates the claimant for the full damage, the claimant may benefit from a 
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redress/contribution claim towards the other tortfeasors (§426 BGB) 121. With regard 
to genuine causal uncertainty, the application of the generalizing theory of adequate 
cause is limited by its narrow confines and also the strict standards of proof applied 
in German law with regard to Haftungsbegrüdende Kausalität. In relation to the first 
limit, German tort law is satisfied not only with evidence that the defendant created a 
risk of harm and that the plaintiff suffered or may have suffered a risk-related loss to 
establish causation in fact, but further requires “a strict limit – in time and space – 
between the defendant’s act and the damage, and that “(t)he particular risk which the 
defendant created and the particular situation must have been likely and apt to 
cause the concrete damage that ensued”122. If the conditions of liability are met and 
the damage is certain, then the defendant must compensate in full the damage, 
regardless of how minimal the defendant’s contribution in regard to causation or 
fault: “the slightest negligence leads to the establishment of full liability” (an all or 
nothing approach)123. In relation to the second limit, German law requires that the 
judge, who is allowed a free assessment of the evidence, is convinced (has a firm 
belief without any reasonable doubts remaining) that the factual allegation is or is not 
true and has the obligation to state the reasons that led him to this convinction124. To 
be convincing, a belief of probability should be close to certainty, thus a balance or 
probabilities standard will not be sufficient to carry conviction. According to some 
interpretations of the German civil procedure rules125, even a 99 per cent belief 
probability will not be considered sufficient, if for instance it relates to a fact 
probability of 51 per cent that the defendant’s contribution caused the damage126. 
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Hence, in these cases, in the absence of certainty, liability is unjustified, unless a 
specific causal presumption applies for fairness purposes, in which case the burden 
of proof shifts to the defendant. The general risk of uncertainty is thus borne by the 
claimant, although occasionally some procedural rules may facilitate the claimant’s 
burden (rules on prima facie evidence, proof proximity or the “so called secondary 
burden of evidence” for the defendant to establish the facts where the claimant has 
done what he reasonable could and the defendant has means to adduce further 
evidence)127. German tort law does not accept “market share” liability, nor the “loss 
of chance” doctrine128. With regard to future harm that remains uncertain, award will 
also be rejected, although if harm is certain but its extent (in the future) is uncertain, 
the German courts will assess this issue at the level of the quantification of damages 
(Haftungsausfüllende Kausalität), the standard of proof required in these cases being 
lower129. 
Damage claims for competition law infringements under section 33(1) of the 
German Competition Act (§ 33 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) 
require the establishment of causal connection between the cartel agreement and 
the damage suffered. Relevant in this respect is the so called theory of adequate 
causation (Adäquanztheorie),130 as it has been developed in the context of German 
tort law: In principle, the cartel agreement must be sufficient to cause the specific 
financial loss suffered. Furthermore, it is required that the damage claimed (as 
defined by reference to the type, the level and the origin of the damage) be 
consistent with the protective purpose of the (allegedly) infringed provision.131  
Generally, the necessary causal link between the prohibited agreement and 
the damage claimed is not to be presumed. However, it seems that in practice the 
direct purchaser can easily prove the causal connection between the cartel 
agreement and the damage suffered.132 
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The situation is different with respect to the damage (i.e. the increased price) 
suffered by the indirect purchasers in subsequent market levels, where the pricing 
depends upon several factors related to the market structure and the prevailing 
commercial strategies. In fact, the increased price on a retail market might not be 
attributable to the cartel agreement on the upstream market, but rather to the (direct) 
purchaser’s pricing strategy, in light of her particular market position and/or the 
conditions in the next market level (as for instance, the price elasticity of demand 
and supply, the intensity of competition etc.).133 Accordingly, the causation 
requirement has to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.134 The damage is, thus, 
causally linked to the prohibited agreement, when most of the providers (direct 
purchasers) in the aftermarket have inflated their prices due to the cartel agreement 
on the upstream market. On the contrary, no causal connection can be asserted, 
where the price increase results from special commercial services or from the 
provider’s dominant position.135 In any event, the (direct) purchaser’s independent 
price fixing strategy does not interrupt the chain of causation between the initial 
cartel agreement and the price increase in the aftermarket.136 
Regard must also be had to the principle that it is upon the claimant bringing 
antitrust damages actions under Section 33(1) GWB to establish the causal 
connection between the cartel agreement and the damage suffered.137 As regards 
the applicable standard of proof, it is sufficient for the claimant to provide prima facie 
evidence of the causal link.138 
The ORWI case of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) constitutes the 
only example so far of a case in which the claim for damages was introduced by an 
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indirect purchaser139. The plaintiff was a printer business which had purchased 
carbonless paper from a wholesaler, subsidiary of one of the paper producers fined 
by the Commission for participating to a price fixing cartel in the carbonless paper 
industry from 1992 until 1995. The printer business became insolvent and assigned 
its damages claims against the cartelists to the plaintiff, a German savings bank, 
which brought an action against the supplier. The action was dismissed by the 
Regional Court of Mannheim, finding that the customers of a subsidiary constitute 
indirect purchasers who may not claim damages. Although the decision was partially 
confirmed by the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe, which nevertheless accepted 
the claim, by invoking that the wholesaler was a 100% subsidiary of the cartelists, 
and thus not providing the possibility for an action for damages in this case would 
have simply enabled cartel members to avoid liability by strategically using its 
subsidiary to supply customers140.  
The BGH nevertheless rejected the decision of the OLG Karlsruhe, thus allowing 
indirect purchasers to raise damages claims against the members of a cartel, at the 
same time, accepting the availability for the defendant of the passing-on defense. 
The BGH highlighted that it is the indirect purchaser alleging that the overcharge was 
passed on to the next market level who bears the burden of proving it, considering 
the theory of adequate causation, as it has been established in the framework of 
German tort law in accordance with EU Law, of relevance in this respect. The Court 
also stated that in view of the economic complexity inherent in pricing and 
competitive pressure in the downstream markets, a causal link between an 
overcharge in the aftermarket, which coincides in time with the prohibited agreement 
or practice under Article 101(1) TFEU, and the relevant cartel agreement may not be 
presumed, thus requiring a substantiation on a case by case basis of the causal link 
between the cartel agreement and the pricing in the next market level141. This causal 
link should be established by reference to the hypothetical price level in the absence 
of the cartel, in particular that the price increase is attributed to the cartel agreement, 
rather than other factors having impact on the pricing strategy. Indeed, as the Court 
explains, “the purchaser’s pricing strategy on the upstream market level is possibly 
not based on the conditions in the market where the cartel agreement is 
implemented, but rather on its particular market position and/or the specific 
conditions in the aftermarket”142. 
                                                          
139
 ORWI, BGH, 28.06.2011 - KZR 75/10, BGHZ 190, 145 = BB 2012, 75 = WRP 2012, 209 = ZIP 
2012, 390 = GRUR 2012, 291 = NJW 2012, 928 = JZ 2012, 789. 
140
 ORWI, OLG Karlsruhe, 11.6.2010 - 6 U 118/05 (Kart), BeckRS 2011, 26582. 
141
 ORWI, BGH, NJW 2012, 928, ¶ 45.  
142
 ORWI, BGH, NJW 2012, 928, ¶ 46. 
38 
 
 
c. France 
 
In contrast to English and German law, article 1382 of the French Civil Code, 
employed as the legal basis for damages claims, puts in place a single heading of 
civil liability, espousing a general open-ended principle of liability without any a priori 
limits on the boundaries of the potential liability of the wrongdoer. In order to 
compensate for such a wide-ranging approach, French law incorporates strict 
causation in law (proximate cause) requirements, which also inevitably influence the 
choice of the causation test. Indeed, to be recoverable the damage should be 
certain, actual and direct143 and civil courts have occasionally referred to the notions 
of direct link, even when examining causation in fact144.  
With regard to the factual/non normative aspect of causation, French courts seem 
to take a variety of approaches. Some civil courts apply the individualizing “theory of 
equivalence of conditions” or sine qua non condition, according to which every factor 
contributing to the occurrence of the effect should be considered as a cause145. In 
other words, all the conditions without which the effect would not have occurred are 
necessarily factual causes. Other courts adopt the generalizing “theory of adequate 
causation”, which involves a selection from the various conditions of the factor that 
depart from the ordinary course of events. However, French courts do not adopt a 
probability-based version of the adequate cause theory, preferring a version that 
emphasizes the departure from the ordinary course of events, for instance by the 
interference of a third party or the plaintiff, or a natural event, following the 
occurrence of the condition generated by the defendant’s conduct, which is 
unforeseeable (“imprévisible”) and unavoidable (“irresistible”), without however 
making any explicit or implicit reference to probabilities146.  
                                                          
143
 Article 1151 on contractual liability exemplifies this requirement of direct and certain damage, 
similar principles animating non-contractual liability, the requirement of direct causal link being 
considered as the most important requirement. 
144
 Duncan Fairgrieve and Florence G’Sell-Macrez, Causation in French Law: Pragmatism and Policy, 
in Richard Goldberg (ed.) Perspectives n Causation (Hart Pub., 2011), 111. 
145
 For a more extensive analysis of the concept of causation in French law see, Florence G’Sell-
Macrez, Recherches sur la notion de causalité (th. Paris I, 2005) ; Cédric Beadeux, La causalité, 
fondement pour une théorie générale de la responsabilité civile (Editions universitaires européennes, 
2010); Christophe Quézel-Ambrunaz, Essai sur la causalité en droit de la responsabilité civile (Dalloz, 
Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses, vol. 99, 2010). 
146
 The recent reforms of French tort law initiated by the publication of the preliminary draft reform 
prepared by a committee chaired by Pierre Catala in September 2005 noted that any attempt to 
define causation would be futile, hence it just referred to the requirement of causality in Article 1347 
without any effort to provide a specific content to the concept.  The preliminary draft also advanced 
the solution of liability in solidum (article 1348 of the preliminary draft) in circumstances of causal 
uncertainty because of multiple sufficient causes (the intervention of multiple defendants each of 
which would have been sufficient to produce the result). The more recent reform draft, currently under 
discussion in French Parliament, adopts explicitly (in Article 10) the adequate cause theory for the 
39 
 
French tort law has predominately chosen to by-pass situations of causal 
uncertainty through the concept of loss of chance (“perte de chance”), which has 
allowed French courts to express the causal impact of the defendant’s conduct in 
probabilistic terms. In particular, French courts employ the “perte de chance” 
doctrine as a response to scientific uncertainty as to the existence of a causal link 
between the condition and the result, responsibility in solidum being mostly used for 
evidential uncertainty with regard to multiple tortfeasors147. Loss of chance enables 
French courts to conceal scientific uncertainty, as loss of a chance is defined as a 
specific head of damage, which is certain, as far as this concerns the loss of a 
favourable opportunity for the claimant. The compensation “must correspond to a 
share of the victim’s various heads of damage” and “lower courts must to that effect 
assess each head of damage and decide the proportion to which it constitutes a 
reparable loss of a chance”148. This comes close to the apportionment which may be 
undertaken under proportional liability, although here the damage is considered as 
“certain” (in view of the strict requirements of the standard of proof for damages in 
France). The solution of French tort law is therefore markedly different from that 
adopted in the context of German tort law and to a certain degree English law, which 
prefer instead to respond to causal uncertainty with procedural rules, such as 
reversing the burden of proof to the defendant, rather than substantive principles 
such as the establishment of a specific type of damages for loss of chance. Although 
compensation for future hypothetical harm is not awarded, it is possible to 
compensate future loss when “all the conditions for its existence in the future already 
exist at the time of the facts”149. The concept of loss of a chance may provide a 
possible way out in such situations as well as situations where the scope of the 
future harm is uncertain. 
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adequate cause, and also proposed to eliminate the reference to the “immediacy” of the causal link 
between the conduct of the defendant and the loss, as this did not add anything to the requirement of 
direct link. 
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Causation jurisprudence in competition law cases in France is intrinsically 
linked with the doctrine of loss of a chance (“perte de chance”), which provides an 
escape valve to the strict requirements of certainty and directness of the causal link 
between the damage and the infringement, although this is not also without limits. 
We will comment on some cases that highlight the specificities of competition law 
causation jurisprudence in France. 
The decision of the European Commission sanctioning the lysine price-fixing 
cartel has led to a number of follow-on damages claims in French courts by 
purchasers of lysine, active in various downstream markets, which saw their 
commercial margins affected by the cartel overcharge. Yet, despite the existence of 
a Commission infringement decision purchasers have faced substantial difficulties in 
actions for damages.  
For instance, the Doux group, Europe’s largest producer of poultry claimed, 
relying on an expert report, that the lysine cartel led to an increase of 30% in the 
price of lysine, as a result of which it suffered damage, due to reduced margins and 
a drop in competitiveness, which amounted to 30 per cent of its purchases of lysine 
during the period of the cartel. Ajinamoto Eurolysine, the defendant in the action and 
an addressee of the Commission’s infringement decision argued that Doux has 
passed on the overcharge to its consumers and that in any case the expert report on 
which Doux’s claim relied was imprecise and did not account for the important 
fluctuations of the price of lysine during this period.  
The Court of appeal of Paris rejected Ajinamoto’s first argument and used the 
loss of chance doctrine in order to respond to the second, thus finding that Doux had 
suffered a loss of a chance that had to be compensated to the level of 30 per cent of 
the amount of damages requested150. No explanation was provided in the judgment 
in the choice of the 30 per cent figure, presumably referring to the probability of 
occurrence of the loss of the chance in this case. The French Supreme Court 
quashed the judgment of the Court of appeal on several grounds151. First, it held that 
the Court of appeal should have considered the possibility that Doux could have 
passed on the overcharge to its consumers, thus requiring the consideration of an 
eventual passing on of an overcharge, but more controversially allocating to the 
claimant the burden to prove that no pass on was effectuated in the circumstances of 
the case152. This is of course incompatible with Article 13 of the Damages Directive, 
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which places the burden of proof on the defendant (passing on is considered as a 
defence). Second, it held that the causal link between the damage and the 
fault/infringement should not be hypothetical, noting that the “erratic” fluctuations of 
the lysine price during the cartel period did not enable the court to make an inference 
of causal link between the damage suffered and the infringement, this appearing 
purely hypothetical in this context.  
The case was then sent back to a different formation of the Paris Court of 
Appeal for reconsideration153. The claimants were arguing three heads, one principal 
and two subsidiary. The principal consisted in compensation of the loss suffered 
during the period of the cartel; the subsidiaries related to the loss of a chance and 
the disgorgement of the illicit profits (referring to the cartel overcharge). The Court of 
appeal considered the possibility of a preliminary ruling question to the Court of 
Justice on the issue of who bears the burden of proof for an eventual pass on of an 
overcharge, yet it found that the issue was clearly settled by the case law of the 
French Supreme Court and that this interpretation of Article 1382 of the French Civil 
Code did not conflict with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. It decided 
eventually not to send any preliminary question to the CJEU on this issue. The 
reader is reminded that the recently adopted Damages Directive proceeds to an EU 
harmonization of the matter by instituting a passing on defence. The Court of appeal 
of Paris then proceeded to examine the principal head of damages claimed by the 
Doux group to find that although the expert report submitted by the claimants at first 
instance relied on, in some instances, imprecise methods, these findings were based 
on the “incontestable” data contained in the Commission’s decision and therefore 
proved beyond doubt the surcharge suffered by Doux and the subsequent damages 
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engendered by the additional expenses incurred in order to mitigate the results of the 
price increase.  
The French courts have had recourse to the doctrine of the loss of chance in 
more than one occasion. For instance, in SA Concurrence v/ SA Aiwa, the Court of 
appeal of Versailles had to assess the damage a discounter had suffered as a result 
of the selective rebates policy adopted by one of its suppliers, which benefitted only 
to some of its competitors154. The Court analysed the damage as a loss of chance to 
make additional sales, and taking into account the volume of sales of the discounter, 
its usual margin and the purchases it made from the supplier during the period of the 
infringement, the court granted damages that corresponded to less than one sixth of 
the amount initially requested by the claimant. In M. Merhi Bassam v. SNC SPPS, 
the Court of appeal of Paris also employed the loss of chance doctrine to provide 
compensation to a potential buyer of a newspapers’ stall who was excluded from the 
distribution network of SNC SPPS, the dominant distribution channel for newspapers 
in the Paris region, for having rejected the presumably abusive clauses of the latter’s 
standard contract, on the basis of the existence of an agreement with the previous 
owner of the newspaper stall to transfer the property rights on the stall subject to the 
approval of SNC SPPS155. Hence, the damage occurred was not hypothetical, as its 
occurrence relied on past events (the sale of the stall). 
 
2. Causation standards and categories of claimants 
 
Although the jurisprudence of the CJEU and/or the Damages Directive do not 
restrict the category of possible claimants in actions for damages and take the widest 
possible approach with regard to standing156, in practice, it may be more difficult to 
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establish causation in bringing successful damages actions157  for parties who are 
not direct purchasers or competitors of the infringers. There are several parties that 
might be affected by a competition law infringement, such as a cartel agreement.  
First, there are direct purchasers/customers that purchase goods or services 
directly by the infringer. These customers forgo the benefit of additional sales in the 
form of utility in consumption or profit when resold to the final customer in a 
competitive environment.  
An equivalent effect occurs for upstream suppliers. By exercising buyer power a 
cartel may enforce lower input prices upstream. Depending on the specific market 
conditions, input price reduction may be enforced by the cartel through output 
contraction affecting both existing and potential suppliers. Moreover, upstream 
suppliers may (partially) pass-on the worsened sales conditions to their own 
upstream suppliers.  
Indirect purchasers, purchasing goods or services from a downstream supplier of 
the infringer may also be affected where the overcharge was passed on to their 
level.   
Exclusionary practices may affect (potential) competitors outside the cartel. 
Competitors in the same relevant market that are not participating in the cartel 
agreement, or potential competitors in related product or neighbouring regional 
markets, are potentially affected by exclusionary practices.  
The opposite can also happen: competitors outside the cartel could benefit by 
softened competition, enjoying higher prices due to the cartel (the so-called umbrella 
effect). The direct customers of these competitors may suffer an overcharge 
because of the umbrella effects.  
Finally, one should also account of the effect on potential customers 
(intermediate customers or end consumers) who would have purchased the products 
or services directly or indirectly from the infringers in the absence of the infringement 
(counterfactual customers). These suffer harm in view of the fact that they did not 
purchase the product or service, although they would have done so if charged the 
counterfactual price, or they are pushed to purchase less-preferred alternative 
products and services.  
Other injured parties may include employees, where the undertaking for which 
they worked goes bankrupt and consequently they lose their employment158, or 
                                                          
157
 OXERA, Quantifying Antitrust Damages – Towards non-binding guidance for courts, December 
2009, p. 24. 
158
 One may also put forward that financial difficulties as a result of exclusionary practices against an 
undertaking may affect its employees if that undertaking imposes salary cuts or fires some employees 
(although in this case the causation chain may break because of the intervention of a third party, the 
management of the excluded undertaking –employer). Yet, if one adopts the broad view of AG Kokott 
in Case C-557/12, KONE AG and Others (January 30, 2014), and consider that all foreseeable losses 
44 
 
shareholders, where the shares of the undertaking they have invested in, victim of 
the anticompetitive conduct, dropped, following the anticompetitive/exclusionary 
conduct. 
There is also a significant “structural asymmetry in the distribution of information 
required by claimants to prove causation159. As the Commission recognized in the 
Staff Working paper accompanying its 2008 White Paper:  
“Even where claimants are in a position to describe and prove the factual 
elements necessary for finding an infringement, having to demonstrate in detail 
the causation and quantification of their damages remains a particular difficulty in 
competition cases. To establish their damage, claimants have to compare the 
anti-competitive situation to a situation which would have existed in the absence 
of the infringement, i.e. a hypothetical competitive market. In a breach of contract 
case, a claimant can normally use market prices at the time of the breach of 
contract as the benchmark for calculating his loss. However, in a typical 
competition case, the claimant cannot rely on the prices at the time of the 
infringement and has to establish what the price would have been in the absence 
of the restriction of competition. For this purpose, he will often depend on 
information that is in the sphere of the defendant and possibly their partners in 
the infringement: for example, notes on the price overcharges agreed secretly 
between cartel members, details on how and when they influenced price and 
other parameters of competition, or internal documents of the infringer showing 
his analysis of market conditions and developments. Also the reconstruction of a 
hypothetical competitive market to quantify the damage caused by the infringer 
usually presupposes knowledge of facts on the commercial activities of the 
infringer and other players on the relevant market. The same or similar types of 
difficulty arise in the context of causation, e.g. when claimants try to identify the 
precise elements of anti-competitive behaviour by an infringer that have caused 
the claimants damage, or the extent to which several infringers have individually 
contributed to the damage caused”160 
A careful analysis of the damages cases for infringement of competition law 
brought in the most significant jurisdictions in Europe, in terms of the size of their 
economy and number of cases, shows that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
damages actions are brought by direct purchasers or competitors, and it is extremely 
rare they are introduced by indirect purchasers. We have not been able to identify 
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one case in which the damage claim was initiated by counterfactual direct (or 
indirect) purchasers. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that it is often 
difficult to identify these counterfactual customers and measure with certainty the 
harm incurred. Indeed, it is difficult to establish how much a counterfactual customer 
would have bought, in the event that he was charged the counterfactual price. Any 
finding will be subject to uncertainty and assumptions about the probable behavior of 
the counterfactual customer and his preferences. Requirements of certainty and 
foreseeability may curb the ability of those customers to receive compensation for 
the harm incurred. Similar difficulties persist with indirect purchasers or end 
customers who are only considered if there is plausible evidence of passing on161. In 
the absence of passing on, the causality link between them and the infringer is 
broken. It is also clear that counterfactual customers resulting from the volume effect 
(customers not buying the product from the indirect purchasers as a result of the 
price increase following the passing on of the overcharge) may not be able to receive 
compensation. Competitors may also be unable to overcome the strict requirements 
of causation, with regard to eventual lost profits resulting from the competition law 
infringement, in view of the limits of the counterfactual inquiry. 
 
3. Different strategies of EU harmonization of causation requirements in 
competition law based actions for damages 
 
In the absence of a clear definition of causation in the different legal systems of 
the EU Member States162, any effort to define a uniform test for establishing 
causation in fact and causation in law remains a Sisyphean task. The Damages 
Directive does not proceed to the development of harmonized rules on causation, 
but only includes provisions that relate to causation, by advancing causal 
presumptions favouring certain categories of defendants (a). Hence, with regard to 
causation, the reference in Manfredi to “the legal system of each Member State to 
prescribe the detailed rules governing the exercise of [the] right [to damages], 
including those on the application of the concept of ‘causal relationship”, remains 
unchanged. The Court of Justice judgment in Kone provides a first glance on the 
emergent EU rules on causation, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the right to 
claim damages for a certain category, umbrella customers, which might find 
themselves disadvantaged by strict national tort law requirements on causation (b).  
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a. Causation in the Damages Directive 
 
Although the declared aim of the Damages Directive is the “approximation” of 
national rules, with the view to “prevent the emergence of wider differences between 
the Member States’ rules governing actions for damages in competition cases”163, 
the Directive observes that the issue of the causal relationship “is not dealt with in 
this Directive” and makes explicit reference to national rules and procedures to deal 
with this issue, under the dual framing of the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence, following the well -established case law of the EU Courts on this 
issue164. Yet, the Directive mentions explicitly that compensation for harm suffered 
may be claimed from any person, subject to the requirement of a causal relationship 
between the harm suffered and the infringement of the competition law165. In contrast 
to US law, the Directive takes an open approach to standing (as any injured party 
may claim full compensation of the harm166), while leaving to the requirement of 
causation the function of potentially circumscribing damages claims167. These 
potential limitations to claims for damages should nonetheless be implemented in 
accordance with the principle of effectiveness, which imposed to Member States the 
obligation to ensure the effective exercise of the “subjective” right to claim damages 
for infringements of competition law168. Although the principle of effectiveness is 
defined negatively in the directive169, the “substantive effectiveness” of the exercise 
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of the right might also be perceived positively as the “right to full compensation” for 
the harm “caused”170, without that of course leading to overcompensation, thus 
indicating the central function of the causation element in the EU framework and the 
need to implement this in a relatively liberal way.  
The Directive contains provisions that illustrate the need to enhance full 
compensation by facilitating the evidence of a causal link in certain specific 
circumstances.  
First, direct or subsequent purchasers may claim compensation for the 
overcharge, that is, the “difference between the price actually paid and the price that 
would have prevailed in the absence of an infringement of competition law”171. This 
may be more than the harm incurred, had the purchasers passed on the overcharge 
or part of it to their consumers (their harm is the overcharge-pass on). The infringer 
may of course raise a passing on defence, by proving the existence and the extent of 
the pass-on of the overcharge172. Yet, the practical implication of such a theoretical 
construction is that it leads to a reversal of the burden of proof to the infringer, who 
needs to establish the existence of the pass on (as pass on constitutes a defence), 
instead of requiring the claimants to bring only evidence of the specific harm caused 
to them by the infringer (thus taking into account in defining their harm the possible 
pass on of the overcharge).  
Second, the Directive puts in place a presumption of causality for the benefit of 
indirect purchasers only, in view of the difficulties of “consumers or undertakings that 
did not themselves make any purchase from the infringer to prove the scope of that 
harm”173. Hence, as it is explained by the Directive, “taking into account the 
commercial practice that price increases are passed on down the supply chain174”, it 
is “appropriate to provide that, where the existence of a claim for damages or the 
amount to be awarded depends on whether or to what degree an overcharge paid by 
the direct purchaser of the infringer has been passed on to the indirect purchaser, 
the latter is regarded as having brought the proof that an overcharge paid by that 
direct purchaser has been passed on to his level, where he is able to show prima 
facie that such passing-on has occurred, unless the infringer can credibly 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that the actual loss has not or not entirely 
been passed on to the indirect purchaser”175. Hence, the indirect purchaser may 
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carry more easily the burden of proof of the existence and scope of pass on by 
simply providing prima facie evidence that “(a) the defendant has committed an 
infringement of competition law; (b) the infringement of competition law resulted in an 
overcharge for the direct purchaser of the defendant; and (c) the indirect purchaser 
has purchased the goods or services that were the object of the infringement of 
competition law, or has purchased goods or services derived from or containing 
them”176. 
 Third, the Damages Directive sets up a causal presumption for cartels in order 
to “remedy the information asymmetry and some of the difficulties associated with 
quantifying antitrust harm, and to ensure the effectiveness of claims for damages”177. 
As is explained in the Directive, 
“it is appropriate to presume that cartel infringements result in harm, in particular via an 
effect on prices. Depending on the facts of the case, cartels result in a rise in prices, 
or prevent a lowering of prices which would otherwise have occurred but for the 
cartel. This presumption should not cover the concrete amount of harm”178. 
Such presumption may result from the Commission’s reliance on studies 
indicating that only 7 per cent of cartels do not lead to overcharging and more 
generally enforcement priorities179. Accordingly, the Directive requires Member 
States to establish a presumption that cartel infringements cause harm, also 
recognizing the right to the infringer to rebut this presumption180. 
Of particular interest is the strategy followed by the Directive in relation to 
conduct by multiple defendants causing harm. The Directive holds undertakings 
jointly infringing competition law (e.g. cartels but also other forms of competition law 
infringement, resulting from other horizontal or vertical agreements, the abuse of a 
collective dominant position) jointly and severally liable for the “entire harm caused 
by the infringement”181. The Directive thus adopts the solution of responsibility in 
solidum, instead of engaging in the application of the equivalence of condition test 
(“but-for test”), which would have led to the finding of no liability where the decision-
maker is faced with multiple sufficient causes or considers the problem to be a 
causation issue by applying the generalizing theory of adequate causation or the 
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individualizing efficiency theory of causation in order to determine the relevant 
cause. Yet, causation issue is not entirely irrelevant as it is indirectly applicable in the 
context of the subsequent right recognized by the Directive of the infringing 
undertaking to recover the overpaid contribution from any other infringing 
undertaking, the amount of which is determined “in light of their relative responsibility 
for the harm caused by the infringement of competition law”182. Hence, liability is 
divided according to the probability that one or other caused the harm. According to 
the Directive, “(t)he determination of that share as the relative responsibility of a 
given infringer and the relevant criteria, such as turnover, market share, or role in the 
cartel, is a matter for the applicable national law, while respecting the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence”183. The Directive thus opens the door to a possible 
implementation of the market shares rule or any other proportional apportionment 
principle developed by each Member State, which, as we have previously explained, 
constitutes an alternative to the determination of causation in fact.  
 In the case of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU following the cumulative 
foreclosure effect of parallel networks of distribution agreements, such as in 
Delimitis184, the suppliers whose networks of distribution agreements would have 
been found to contribute to the cumulative foreclosure effect and hence to infringe 
Article 101 TFEU would be found jointly and severally liable for the entire harm 
caused by the infringement. This even if the cumulative effect would have also 
resulted without the intervention of their network, if the contribution of their network 
to the cumulative effect is not substantial, but is of a level to be considered an 
infringement of Article 101 TFEU185. The application of the “but-for” test would have 
resulted in no liability being found in such circumstances, as the condition (the 
network of distribution agreements) would not have been necessary for the 
occurrence of the harm. Yet, the contribution of each network of similar agreements 
to the cumulative effect would be of relevance when determining the apportionment 
of the damages between the different infringers found jointly and severally liable, 
should one of them request the recovery from any other infringing undertaking of the 
damages paid in excess of its relative responsibility. In this case, reference may be 
made to the respective market shares of the undertaking and/or its share of the 
cumulative effect, as determined in the context of the second step of the Delimitis 
test. 
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Yet the Damages Directive does not provide for equivalent presumptions of 
causality for injured parties other than indirect purchasers, such as counterfactual 
customers, and umbrella customers, who may find it difficult to prove the causal link 
between the anticompetitive conduct of the defendant and the harm they suffered. 
Harm is also defined narrowly as only referring to the higher prices paid as a result of 
the anticompetitive conduct or reduced sales leading to a loss of profit, without the 
Directive making any reference to other types of harm that may result from an 
anticompetitive exercise of market power, such as a reduction of consumer choice, 
or reduction of innovation or quality, which do not benefit from equivalent causal 
presumptions186. It follows that the EU Courts will inevitably be called, not only to 
interpret the provisions of the Directive, but also to fill in the numerous areas of the 
law on which the Directive remains silent. One of these is the issue of causation. A 
recent preliminary ruling procedure at the CJEU has precisely examined this issue. 
 
b. Causation in the CJEU: umbrella customers and the emergence of the 
approximation by jurisprudence method 
 
Inasmuch as both the CJEU and the EU Legislator have emphasized that full 
compensation of anyone harmed is the cornerstone of the EU law on damages 
claims for competition law infringements, the case law and the legislative proposals 
remain silent as to the possibility of injured parties that are remote in the “vertical 
value chain187” of the infringer188, or customers who are not part of the vertical value 
chain, such as counterfactual or umbrella customers.  
With regard to the first type of customers, the Commission’s proposal for the 
Damages Directive acknowledged that remoteness or foreseeability requirements 
may make it legally “impossible” for certain categories of indirect purchasers in a 
remote position of the vertical value chain to claim full compensation. The solution 
advanced by the Commission provided that “in a situation where the overcharge was 
passed on to persons who are legally unable to claim compensation, it is not 
appropriate to allow the infringing undertaking to invoke the passing-on defence, as 
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this would render it free of liability for the harm which it has caused”189. No equivalent 
provision exists in the final version of the Directive, thus indicating that if such an 
issue emerges, it will have to be dealt by the national courts and eventually the 
CJEU. 
 With regard to the second category of customers, the recent reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Austrian Supreme Court to the CJEU in KONE AG and 
Others arising against the background of the elevator cartel case, illustrates some of 
the questions to which the CJEU will inevitably be asked to elucidate. The Austrian 
Supreme Court’s question was formulated by the national court as referring to the 
issue of standing, as it questioned the CJEU whether "any person may claim from 
members of a cartel damages also for the loss which he has been caused by a 
person not party to the cartel who, benefiting from the protection of the increased 
market prices, raises his own prices for his products more than he would have done 
without the cartel (umbrella pricing)190”, but it implicitly essentially raised an issue of 
causation, as it concerned a question, “not yet settled at European Union level, of 
whether the civil liability in damages of the members of a cartel also extends to 
‘umbrella effects’ or ‘umbrella pricing’”191. AG Kokott reformulated the question in 
order to address two issues (standing and causation) explaining that  
“(t)here is said to be umbrella pricing when undertakings that are not themselves 
party to a cartel, benefiting from the protection of the cartel’s practices (operating 
‘under the cartel’s umbrella’, so to speak), knowingly or unknowingly set their own 
prices higher than they would otherwise have been able to under competitive 
conditions. Does European Union law require that customers of undertakings not 
party to the cartel should be able to claim compensation for the inflated prices 
charged by those undertakings from the members of the cartel before the 
national courts? [the standing issue] Or, conversely, may such an obligation to 
award compensation be excluded in national civil law on the ground that the loss 
suffered is indirect and too remote? [the causation issue]192”. 
Yet, as it further explained the issue of causation was the most crucial one as 
“(f)rom a legal point of view, the issue of whether members of cartels can also be 
held civilly liable for umbrella pricing hangs on the existence or otherwise of a 
causal link. The question is whether there is a sufficiently close connection 
between the cartel and the losses resulting from umbrella pricing caused by a 
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cartel, or whether these are excessively remote losses for which damages cannot 
reasonably be awarded against the members of the cartel”193. 
 The injured party claiming damages had indeed purchased elevators from a 
manufacturer not involved in the cartel, paying a price which in its opinion was set 
under the protection of the elevator cartel and was thus higher than would otherwise 
have been expected under competitive conditions. However, the implementation of 
Austrian tort law dismissed “from the outset” such claim for compensation, because 
according to the Austrian courts the loss on account of which the injured party had 
brought its action could not be attributed to the parties to the cartel on legal grounds. 
First, the adequate causal link required under Austrian law was not present, and 
second, the loss alleged was not deemed covered by the protective purpose of the 
competition rules194. The Austrian court had doubts as to the application of the 
restrictive national tort law rules in view of the principle of effectiveness.  
 Advocate general Kokott developed a threefold strategy in order to provide a 
reply to the referring court and bring causation issues within the scope of the 
institutional competence of the EU court to provide an interpretation of EU law. 
Although the CJEU did not follow that strategy in its final judgment, and preferred a 
more “traditional” approach, relying on the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence, Advocate General Kokott’s Opinion provides an interesting blueprint on 
what an EU rule on causation would look like, if the CJEU had decided to proceed to 
some harmonized EU rule on the existence of a causal link. 
 The first part consisted in linking the issue of causation, which the CJEU in 
Manfredi addressed as an issue to be dealt with by the domestic legal system of 
each Member State, within the ambit of EU law. To do so, AG Kokott introduced a 
distinction between the existence or the constitutive rules of the right to claim 
damages for competition law infringement (“the question of whether compensation is 
to be granted”), which is an issue of EU law, and “the details of application of such 
claims and the rules for their actual enforcement” (“the question of how 
compensation is to be granted”), which are left to domestic legal systems. The AG 
then mentioned the “direct anchoring” of the principle that any individual is entitled to 
claim compensation for loss sustained in the presence of a causal relationship 
between the loss and the infringement of EU law. She based her interpretation on a 
variety of grounds: the need for consistency within the EU system of liability of 
Member States for their infringements of EU law, the direct effect of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU, and the principle of the “effet utile” of EU law. Having established that 
constitutive principles emanate from and are determined by EU law, the AG 
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classified the question of the recoverability of losses engendered by umbrella pricing 
as relating to the “fundamental question of whether (cartel members) can be sued by 
persons who are not their direct or indirect customers195”, thus formulating the issue 
as being conceptually close to the questions of standing and the types of losses that 
are recoverable under EU law, which have already been determined by EU law196. 
Consequently, the AG felt that EU law also regulated the issue of the establishment 
of a causal link. Surprisingly, she did not make any reference to the principle of 
supremacy of EU law, which should have entered into play in the presence of a 
conflicting national rule, had this issue, as she advocated, being one regulated by 
EU law. 
 The second part of AG’s Opinion considered “the specific conditions” that 
“may be attached under European law to the establishment of a causal link between 
a cartel and umbrella pricing”197. One may consider that this issue relates more to 
the question of “how compensation is to be granted”, the modalities of 
compensation, rather than the constitutive rules of “whether compensation should be 
granted”, yet the a priori practically exclusion of claims introduced by umbrella 
customers under Austrian law enabled the AG to conflate the two issues in order to 
provide a useful answer to the national court. The AG proceeded to elaborate on 
some broad principles of EU causation law, such as a reference to the conditio sine 
qua non or “but for causal link”, the requirement of a “sufficiently direct causal nexus” 
in the implementation of Article 340 TFEU on the liability of Member States for 
infringement of EU law or some EU merger cases, and the importance of a 
“normative examination” in establishing legal causation leading to the identification in 
all European legal systems, despite the different terminology employed (“legal 
causation, adaquat Kausalität and the like”), of normative principles that “inform the 
concept of a sufficiently direct causal link”198. By separating the causation in fact 
from the causation in law or “scope of the liability” element, AG Kokott seems to 
have aimed to bring the second within the scope of the constitutive rules of the right 
to claim damages, and thus under the ambit of EU law, while leaving causation in 
fact to be determined according to the techniques developed in each domestic legal 
system. Of course, as we have previously shown, the distinction is somehow artificial 
as ultimately the two issues are profoundly interlinked. Yet, this approach enabled 
AG Kokott to comment freely on the way the requirement of causal link should be 
interpreted as a matter of EU law. She stressed that the requirement of “a direct 
causal link must not be regarded as being the same as a single causal link” and that 
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“there is sufficient support for the assumption of a direct causal link if the cartel was 
at least a contributory cause of the umbrella pricing”199. The aim was of course to 
deal with situations of multiple causes, which are frequent, if not always the case, in 
the implementation of EU competition law, because of the intervention of the conduct 
of a third party in the realization of the harm. This is intrinsically linked to the normal 
operation of the market system and the fact that undertakings are “(also) guided by 
the relevant trading conditions”, which may occasionally break the causal chain200. 
According to AG Kokott, such issues are also raised with regard to indirect 
purchasers who are not denied under EU law the possibility of claiming damages 
even if the incurrence of their loss “is ultimately dictated by the freely-made 
corporate decision of a third party (the intermediary trader)”201.In any case, “(p)rices 
rarely have only one cause”, hence “it would be unreasonable to make the civil 
liability of cartel members subject to the condition of their being the single cause”202. 
That led the AG to espouse a relatively broad concept of cause, by accepting that a 
simple contribution of the conduct “towards a distortion of the price formation 
mechanisms that normally apply on the market in question” may constitute relevant 
cause. That potentially very broad liability principle announced, the AG then 
addressed the issue of the necessary limitation of its scope. 
 This constitutes the third step in the strategy of AG Kokott to develop broader 
EU causation rules. The AG clearly indicated that “the criterion of a sufficiently direct 
causal link is in substance intended, on the one hand, to ensure that a person who 
has acted unlawfully is liable only for such loss as he could reasonably have 
foreseen” and “(o)n the other hand, a person is liable only for loss the compensation 
of which is consistent with the objectives of the provision of law which he has 
infringed”203. With regard to the first issue, the AG distinguished the situation of 
“umbrella pricing” which is foreseeable by cartel members from “loss which results 
from an entirely extraordinary train of events, and therefore, ensues via an atypical 
causal chain”204. Her main argument was that essentially that was “very much in the 
normal way of things” and that cartel members should have expected that non cartel 
members would have raised their prices as a result of the cartel, in comparison to 
the prices in the absence of the cartel, such behaviour being “far from unusual” and 
“economically rational”, and thus foreseeable by the members of the cartel but also 
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in the interest of the cartel members, in order to ensure the success of their cartel205. 
But more important for the reasoning of the AG was to link such an interpretation of 
the causation in law requirement with the protective scope of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, transposing in EU law, the “scope of the rule” doctrine of German tort law206. 
Summarizing a highly interesting discussion, AG Kokott referred to the 
compensatory aim of EU competition law enforcement and to deterrence, perceived 
not as an efficiency objective, but an expression of corrective justice207. Such 
interpretation of the scope of protection of EU competition law opens the gate to 
enforcement by anyone incurring some form of harm (economic and moral?) to 
which a competition law infringement may have contributed. This is not a narrow 
definition of the scope of protection, and AG Kokott understands that well, as she 
mentions that no overloading of national courts with claims from injured parties by 
umbrella pricing is to be expected, in view of “the relatively high hurdles in terms of 
burden of proof208” that await such claimants in the civil courts, suggesting that “any 
potential ‘umbrella plaintiff” “weigh up carefully the pros and cons of taking out a civil 
action against cartel members”209. Finally, no evidence of fault or intent is required, 
the existence of a causal link being based on “purely objective criteria”, hence, mere 
negligence is sufficient210. The only limit to the extent of the losses that umbrella 
customers may request compensation from cartel members is the principle of 
“overcompensation”, which is defined by AG Kokott as being conceptually linked to 
the issue of causation, as it “requires cartel members only to make good the loss 
which they have caused (or to which they have contributed) on the market in 
question by their anti-competitive practices”, which is actually somewhat tautological 
in view of the weak standard of causation required by the AG (a simple 
“contribution”). 
 The CJEU did not follow the full strategy proposed by AG Kokott and re-
affirmed the preference for national law to deal with causation issues, under the 
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double discipline of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. The Court 
confirmed once again that “it is, in principle, for the domestic legal system of each 
Member State to lay down the detailed rules governing the application of the concept 
of the ‘causal link’”, and that “national legislation must ensure that European Union 
competition law is fully effective”211. Effectiveness in this context was interpreted as 
requiring national rules on causation to “specifically take into account the objective 
pursued by Article 101 TFEU, which aims to guarantee effective and undistorted 
competition in the internal market, and, accordingly, prices set on the basis of free 
competition” and the need to “recognise the right of any individual to claim 
compensation for loss sustained”212. Effectiveness would have been “put at risk if the 
right of any individual to claim compensation for harm suffered were subjected by 
national law, categorically and regardless of the particular circumstances of the case, 
to the existence of a direct causal link while excluding that right because the 
individual concerned had no contractual links with a member of the cartel, but with 
an undertaking not party thereto”213. According to the Court, this causal link cannot 
be excluded in principle as the pricing policy of the undertaking inflicting damage to 
umbrella customers, “is a result of the cartel that contributed to the distortion of price 
formation mechanisms governing competitive markets”214. By emphasizing 
“contribution” as a sufficient element for establishing a causal link in these 
circumstances, the CJEU seems to frame the minimum core required in the definition 
of the causal link for that to ensure the effectiveness of EU competition law 
prohibitions. The exclusion of a category of victims, umbrella customers, is not 
compatible with this minimum EU law defined core. 
 
c. Towards a broad and instrumental conception of causation in EU competition 
law on damages actions 
 
As it has been rightly observed by some commentators215, the opinion of AG 
Kokott relied greatly on the evidence put forward by the parties, being relatively 
agnostic as to the “merits” of the case beforehand, based on some categorical 
analysis of the “type” of claim or loss brought. As the AG herself puts it, “it will always 
be necessary to carry out a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant 
circumstances in order to determine whether the cartel in the case in question has 
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given rise to umbrella pricing”216. Furthermore, “(s)hifting the umbrella pricing issue 
from the level of pure theory to that of the production of evidence seems to me to be 
the best way of contributing to the effective enforcement of the European competition 
rules, while taking due account of the interests of all economic operators”217. Indeed, 
harm resulting from umbrella pricing is neither “speculative”, nor “uncertain”218. 
Looking at the facts, a “categorical exclusion” of such harm (through standing or 
causation rules), would not make much sense219. The CJEU also agreed that “a loss 
being suffered by the customer of an undertaking not party to a cartel, but benefiting 
from the economic conditions of umbrella pricing, because of an offer price higher 
than it would have been but for the existence of that cartel is one of the possible 
effects of the cartel, that the members thereof cannot disregard”, although it did not 
get into a detailed examination of the topic, which in any case is not expected by the 
CJEU in a preliminary ruling procedure. The possibility that a cartel contributed to 
high prices for umbrella customers “cannot be ruled out”, which implies that a 
categorical rule excluding umbrella customers, would affect the legitimate right of 
certain victims of competition law infringements to receive compensation. The third 
party intervention in this context does not break the causal link between the cartel 
and the damage. However, the CJEU did not provide guidance as to the causal test 
that would apply in order to assess the individual circumstances of the case and 
conclude, or not, on the existence of a causal link. The only guidance provided 
consists in affirming that “contribution” may be a sufficient factor in establishing 
causation. 
The introduction by AG Kokott in her Opinion in KONE AG of the “scope of the 
rule” doctrine of German law as a principle of EU law in the assessment of causation 
could have had important implications as to the development of the EU law on 
damages claims for competition law infringements. First, her conception of the 
causal link as “contribution”, which was accepted by the CJEU, may lead to a broad 
interpretation of the causation in law and causation in fact requirements. Second, her 
broad interpretation of the scope of protection of competition law provides the basis 
for the development by the case law of the EU Courts of flexible causation rules for 
damages actions brought for EU competition law infringements that will take into 
account the specificities of antitrust damages claims, in comparison with torts for 
other kinds of injuries. This may indeed provide for flexible rules in order to assess 
the merely economic damage suffered and the use of economic and econometric 
evidence. This part of her strategy was not followed by the CJEU. 
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It is important here to note the close-ended character of the counterfactual 
inquiry in law. The objective is not to speculate on any imaginable turn of events and 
hypothetical scenarios or the most likely alternative cause of action for the actors 
involved, which would be a “hopelessly indeterminate” and “inevitably influenced by 
policy-based conventions, expectations, or goals”, but, as is explained by Wright, 
instead to determine “the causal processes at work, in the one scenario that did 
happen”220. Hence, we usually proceed by eliminating the condition being tested 
from the sufficient set of actual antecedent conditions in order to determine “by 
matching the remaining conditions in the set against the applicable causal 
generalization”, “whether the set still would be sufficient for the occurrence of the 
result”221. Resolving this causal inquiry depends, according to Wright, on “our 
empirical knowledge of the conditions that existed and the possibly applicable causal 
generalizations, not on policy considerations222”. Hence, his conclusion that any 
indeterminacy results not from the open-ended character of the counterfactual test 
but from “defects in our empirical knowledge”223. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Stapleton advances the concept of 
“involvement”, instead of the narrower one of “necessity”, the information conveyed 
by the notion of “involvement” being “context-specific” and depending on the 
specification of the particular factor of interest to the legal system and consequently 
of the underlying interrogation that the concept of causation aims to unravel224. 
According to Stapleton, “lawyers should choose an interrogation underlying causal 
usage in the law that captures all ways in which the (specified) factor might be 
involved in the existence of the particular phenomenon in issue”225. This may extend 
beyond necessity and sufficiency and may identify simple “contribution” as a cause, 
“even where the factor is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of the 
particular phenomenon”226. Stapleton refutes the argument that the broader concept 
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of “involvement” could lead to “overinclusiveness (that is too many causes)”, 
because of the “doctrinal filters” offered by the concept of causation in law and the 
requirements of proximate cause227, or one could also add “scope of the rule”, as it is 
adopted in some continental European systems and suggested by AG Kokott as an 
EU law rule in KONE AG, although this was not accepted by the CJEU,  
From this perspective, causation in fact should provide the requisite “width of 
coverage” that is needed to accommodate the regulatory strategies followed by the 
legal system in this context. If the aim of law’s intervention is to prevent harm, such 
project requires the legal system “to address all involved factors – even those that 
some might describe as mere conditions”228. Were the law to select a narrower 
interrogation underlying the causal language, this might have jeopardized the 
specific regulatory project. The “scope of the rule” doctrine would be a particularly 
salient factor in determining the “width of coverage” of the causation enquiry in law. 
The existence of “filtering devices”, such as proximate cause or the “scope of the 
rule” doctrine, enabling “the specification of a small finite number of factors whose 
possible involvement in the existence of a particular phenomenon in the actual world 
is being examined”, distinguishes the causation inquiry in law from that undertaken in 
social sciences and/or metaphysics.  
By choosing to rely on a broad concept of the causal link, defined as 
“contribution”, the CJEU is able to assist the claimant(s) in putting forward a 
causation narrative. This broad conception may potentially also favour defendants, 
when these argue a pass on defence. While not being open-ended, this concept of 
causation remains extremely broad and offers considerable discretion to national 
judges to frame it according to the circumstances of the case and the requirements 
of their legal system. May be the “closure” of the system through the adoption of a 
“scope of the rule” doctrine (as suggested by Advocate General Kokott) or other 
alternatives is something that may be envisaged in the future, should a broad 
concept of causation lead to a flood of competition damages cases and difficulties as 
to the definition of the conceptual contours of the causal link. The experience gained 
in the meantime would be valuable, in particular in view of the complex economic 
evidence usually relied upon by litigants in this area of law. 
Although the Damages Directive and the EU courts have been reticent to 
engage in an extensive harmonization of the causation requirement, a more 
extensive harmonization approach was nevertheless followed with regard to 
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situations of causal uncertainty that are generated by the existence of multiple 
tortfeasors. In this case, the Damages Directive provides for more harmonized rules. 
 
d. Beyond causation: The instrument of joint (solidary) and several liability 
 
Article 11 of the Damages Directive establishes the rule of joint and several 
liability of multiple tortfeasors for competition law damages, representing the choice 
of the EU legislator for a regime of several and joint liability instead of choosing to 
channel liability to one tortfeasor for the whole damage and then resolve the 
attribution issue by resorting to some sort of causal proportional liability rule. 
According to Article 11(1), “Member States shall ensure that undertakings which 
have infringed competition law through joint behaviour are jointly and severally liable 
for the harm caused by the infringement of competition law: each of those 
undertakings is bound to compensate for the harm in full, and the injured party has 
the right to require full compensation from any of them until he has been fully 
compensated”229. Hence, in a fact pattern where the damage was caused by the 
cumulative foreclosure effect created by the parallel networks of agreements with 
similar clauses, the so called Delimitis cumulative effects doctrine, all the 
undertakings whose network of contracts participated to this cumulative effect will be 
found liable, under the joint and several liability doctrine230. Hence, each of the 
undertakings is bound to compensate for the harm in full, and the injured party may 
require full compensation from any of them. 
Article 11(4) requires Member States to ensure that an infringing undertaking 
may recover a contribution from any other infringing undertaking, the amount of 
which shall be determined in the light of their relative responsibility for the harm 
caused by the infringement of competition law. This right of contribution extends only 
to “infringing undertakings” and thus does not seem to cover the situation of a 
                                                          
229
 Art. 11(2), introduced when the Commission’s proposal was examined by the European 
Parliament, provides an exception to this rule for infringers that are small or medium sized 
enterprises, who shall be liable only to their own direct and indirect purchasers [note there is no 
reference to providers as in Article 11(3)] under certain conditions, in particular if their “market share 
in the relevant market was below 5% at any time during the infringement” or if the application of the 
general rule on joint and several liability would “irretrievably jeopardize its economic viability and 
cause its assets to lose all their value”. According to Article 11(2), the small or medium sized 
enterprise will not however benefit from such exception if it led the infringement or coerced other 
undertakings to participate in the infringement or if it was a recidivist. 
230
 Case C-234/89, Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG. [1991] ECR I-935: a combination of 
tying/exclusive purchasing agreements might infringe Article 101 TFEU if it would be difficult for 
competing suppliers to enter the market because of the cumulative effects of the networks of 
agreements by different suppliers in the market (the foreclosure effect of all the networks of 
agreements) and the supplier network to which the agreement under consideration formed part had a 
significant contribution to the foreclosure effect (contribution of the specific network of agreements to 
the foreclosure effect). 
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competitor not participating to the cartel, and thus not committing a competition law 
infringement, who may have benefitted from the higher cartel prices by charging 
higher prices to his consumers (umbrella customers). Hence, it is possible that, 
following Kone, umbrella customers may claim full compensation for the harm 
caused by the infringing undertakings (e.g. members of the cartel or found liable for 
having abused their collective dominant position), the latter not being able to recover 
a contribution, on the basis of Article 11(4) of the Directive, from a non-cartelist 
competitor benefitting from the umbrella price. This windfall profit (from the 
competition law infringement) may however be recovered on the basis of national 
rules on restitution (e.g. unjust enrichment), the Directive being silent on this issue. 
One may however claim that awarding recovery in this context will limit deterrence 
and might be indirectly incompatible, if not with the letter, at least with the spirit of the 
Directive, assuming that national courts have the obligation to interpret national law 
in conformity with an EU directive, even more so if the Damages Directive is 
interpreted as also covering actions for damages based on restitution231. Deterrence 
would favour a no contribution rule in this context, as it would have also been the 
case in the context of an action from an infringing undertaking against another 
infringing undertaking232. Yet, as it is clear from the recovery rule included in Article 
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 Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-
4135. 
232
 A different approach has prevailed in the US, where the Supreme Court in its judgment in Texas 
Industries v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981) affirmed the common law rule against 
contribution among competition law defendants and found that there was no indication that Congress 
considered contribution among joint violators under the US antitrust laws, leaving congressional 
action as the only avenue for those seeking to allow contribution. A tortfeasor who paid damages to a 
plaintiff is not entitled to contribution from other competition law tortfeasors, since each tortfeasor  
remains  responsible for the entire loss and actions for contribution among co- defendants are barred 
in antitrust cases. Furthermore, where there have been settlements between the parties injured and 
some of the tortfeasors, only the actual amount of the settlements is deducted from the treble 
damages awards against the tortfeasors who have not settled who are also responsible for the part of 
the damage inflicted by the settling defendant which was not covered by the settlement. The no-
contribution rule was originally adopted by the English courts for joint tortfeasors in Merryweather v. 
Nixan (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B.), on the basis of the principle of ex turpi causa non oritur 
actio: out of a base (illegal or immoral) consideration, no action arises. At that time the term “joint 
tortfeasors” referred only to those defendants that have acted intentionally and in concert. It was later 
extended to all joint tortfeasors, even those that concurrently caused indivisible harm by negligence, 
although in this case the extent of the rule was limited by the courts. For a discussion, see J. S. 
Dillbary, Apportioning Liability Behind a Veil of Uncertainty, (2011) 62 Hastings Law Journal 1729-
1792. In view of the harshness of the rule, the UK Parliament enacted the Law Reform (Married 
Women and Tortfeasors) Act in 1935, providing for a contribution rule among tortfeasors, followed by 
the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945. Similarly in the US, many States have 
fashioned rules of contribution in one form or another in the first decades of the 20
th
 century. Yet, in  
Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, the Supreme Court refused to follow that trend and adopt 
contribution for antitrust violators. For an analysis of the respective merits of the no contribution  or 
contribution rules in the US context, see generally W.M. Landes & R. Posner, Joint and Multiple 
Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 517-555 (noting that from an 
efficiency perspective, it is impossible to pronounce that no contribution is a more efficient rule than 
contribution, as the result “depends on the trade-off between the administrative cost savings under 
the former and the informational and insurance benefits under the latter”, although they also 
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11(4), fairness concerns, rather than deterrence, animate the EU rules applying in 
this context233. 
The contribution rule constitutes indeed a feature of tort law regimes in 
Europe. In the UK, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 provides that “(a)ny 
person liable in respect of any damage suffered by another person may recover 
contribution from any other person liable in respect of the same damage (whether 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
expressed the feeling that “a broad contribution rule is almost certainly less efficient than no 
contribution”); F. Easterbrook, W. Landes & R. Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, (1980) 23 Journal of Law and Economics 331-370 (finding that even if 
the no contribution rule leads to more deterrence, its efficiency “from an overall social standpoint” 
remains a difficult question as one should consider issues of risk aversion and legal error); M. 
Polinsky & S. Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic 
Analysis, (1981) 33 Stanford Law Review 447-471 (noting, among others, that a no contribution rule 
might be less efficient as it achieves deterrence by imposing greater risks on innocent parties and 
allocates liability imprecisely, thus discouraging some firms from engaging  in socially beneficial 
activities); L. A. Kornhauser & R. L. Revesz, Joint and Several Liability, in (M. Faure ed.) Tort Law 
and Economics (Edward Elgar, 2009), 109-134 (remarking that when it comes to fairness, joint and 
several liability with no contribution may place a disproportionate burden on the defendant with the 
smaller share of the liability); ABA, Antitrust Section, Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust 
Litigation  (Monograph 11), (ABA: 1986) (highlighting, among other issues, the possible over-
deterrence or under-deterrence effects that a contribution or a no contribution rule will have, 
depending on the nature of the antitrust violation and assumptions on the risk averse or risk seeking 
character of competition law infringers). In response to these harsh rules, firms engaged in or 
accused of price fixing often enter into judgment-sharing agreements, in which the firms agree to 
allocate financial responsibility for any private liability among them: for a discussion, see C.R. Leslie, 
Judgment-Sharing Agreements, (2009) 58(5) Duke Law Journal 747-825. Recently the US Antitrust 
Modernization Commission discussed a recommendation to US Congress to enact legislation 
allowing non-settling defendants to seek contribution from other non-settling defendants and that 
would also permit non-settling defendants to obtain reduction of the plaintiffs’ claims by the amount of 
the settlement(s) or the allocated share(s) of liability of the settling defendant(s), whichever amount is 
greater: See, Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report & Recommendation (April 2007), 18 
(proposal 46), 243-244, 251-255. The AMC indeed noted (at 244) that “(t)he existing rules of joint and 
several liability without a right of contribution and only limited claim reduction have given rise to 
substantial criticism regarding fairness. These rules permit plaintiffs to settle with some defendants at 
an early stage for a relatively small amount of damages, leaving remaining, non-settling defendants 
potentially liable for nearly the entire damages caused by the joint conduct, trebled. As a result, these 
rules can cause a “race” to settle, potentially leaving defendants that had a small or no role in the 
overall anticompetitive scheme with disproportionately large potential liability”. Yet, no legislative 
initiative has been so far enacted by US Congress on this issue, thus indicating a divergence between 
the deterrence-oriented US no contribution rule and the fairness-oriented European contribution rule. 
For a discussion with regard to the European context, see M. Hviid & A. Medvedev, The Role of 
Contribution among Defendants in Private Antitrust Litigation, CCP Working Paper 08-3, available at 
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/ccp08-3.pdf (noting that although the no 
contribution rule may lead to higher levels of aggregate damages and more information available to 
the private plaintiff, it has also the potential to “neuter any public leniency programme, thereby 
possibly reducing the number of cartels detected”). 
233
 There are various options on offer: apart from the basic choice of a no contribution rule or a 
contribution rule, if the contribution rule option is selected there are various options regarding the 
dividing and apportioning of damages among a cluster of antitrust co-conspirators. According to the 
Supreme Court in Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981),, “various formulae are 
suggested: damages may be allocated according to market shares, relative profits, sales to the 
particular plaintiff, the role in the organization and operation of the conspiracy, or simply pro rata, 
assessing an equal amount against each participant on the theory that each one is equally liable for 
the injury caused by collective action”. 
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jointly with him or otherwise)”234. The above provision applies not only where there is 
judgment against the defendant, but also where the defendant has settled the 
claim235. 
At the European level, the Draft Common Frame of Reference employs the 
terminology “solidary liability” (instead of joint and several liability) and provides for a 
default rule of equal sharing for solidary debtors [Art. III.-4:106(1)], “unless different 
shares of liability are more appropriate having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case and in particular to fault or to the extent to which a source of danger for which 
one of them was responsible contributed to the occurrence or extent of the damage” 
[Art. III.-4:106(2)], thus stipulating a special rule for cases of solidary liability resulting 
from causing the same damage236. It is also provided that “(a) solidary debtor who 
has performed more than that debtor’s share has a right to recover the excess from 
any of the other debtors to the extent of each debtor’s unperformed share, together 
with a share of any costs reasonably incurred [Art. III.-4:107]. Although these rules 
are not binding, they provide a reference point for the multiple national rules on this 
issue. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 The emergence of actions for damages as one of the main forms of 
competition law enforcement in Europe is a recent phenomenon. The issue of the 
standing of indirect purchasers has been a primary focus for legal commentators, as 
is attested by the number of studies published on this topic. The most recent book-
length studies published on competition law damages typically dedicate a chapter on 
standing issues237. This choice may have been influenced by the debate in the 
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 Section 1(1) of the UK Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. According to Section 2(2) of the Act, 
“[…] the amount of the contribution recoverable from any person shall be such as may be found by 
the court to be just and equitable having regard to the extent of that person’s responsibility for the 
damage in question”. It is also mentioned ion Section 1(3) that “the person from whom the 
contribution is sought shall not by virtue of any contribution awarded […] be required to pay in respect 
of the damage a greater amount than the amount of those damages as so limited or reduced”, for 
instance by “any limit imposed by or under any enactment or by any agreement made before the 
damage occurred” or by “any corresponding limit or reduction under the law of a country outside 
England and Wales”. For a discussion of the English law of contribution see, C. Mitchel, The Law of 
Contribution and Reimbursement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
235
 Section 1(4) of the UK Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978. 
236
 As it is remarked in the notes to Art. III.-4:106, “(t)he sharing of liability for damages between those 
responsible for the same damage is done in different ways in different legal systems. Sometimes it is 
done according to the degree of seriousness of the wrongdoing of those involved [see for instance, in 
French, Greek, Danish, Polish jurisprudence] […] Elsewhere causal participation is what matters [see 
for instance in German, Austrian, Italian, Spanish jurisprudence]”. Finally, under English law (Civil 
Liability (Contribution) Act 1978) the matter is left to the discretion of the judge. 
237
 See, for instance, D. Mc Fadden, The Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Ireland (Hart 
Pub. 2013); D. Ashton & D. Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU – Law and Practice 
(Edward Elgar, 2013). 
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United States (U.S), which has focused predominately on this issue, since the 
Supreme Court barred indirect purchasers from pursuing treble damage claims 
under Clayton Act § 4 in Illinois Brick, certain limited exceptions set aside238. The US 
solution and the debate over indirect purchasers may be explained by the specific 
function played by private enforcement in the US, its overall architecture aiming to 
“provide a mechanism for wider public regulatory and observance goals”, in 
particular deterrence, thus going beyond compensation for loss, a feature that also 
explains the various specificities of the US system of private enforcement (e.g. cost 
rules), in comparison to the role of private enforcement in other parts of the world239. 
In contrast, in the European civil justice systems, the role of private enforcement has 
principally, but not exclusively, been that of providing compensation and operating as 
an instrument of corrective justice. Hence, issues of standing, as any other 
dimension of a tort law system cannot be determined on the sole basis of deterrence 
considerations. The competition law field is no exception and the EU Courts, 
followed by the European Commission, have underlined the goal of compensation as 
the principal, but again non-exclusive, aim of private enforcement in EU competition 
law. The choice for a system of single, and not multiple, damages attest to that 
normative choice, even if there was evidence that double damages might have been 
a more efficient option, from a deterrence perspective but also from a mixed 
deterrence-corrective justice perspective (e.g. double damages only for cartel 
cases)240.  
In a regime based on corrective justice considerations, causation 
requirements will tend to play a predominant role in regulating the damages claims 
brought forward. By relying on the tort law systems of the various Member States 
and avoiding any harmonization of these rules at the EU level, the EU legislator and 
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 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Indirect purchasers are not however barred from 
seeking injunctive relief under Clayton Act § 16, provided they meet the other requirements set in this 
context: Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorade Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). Some States have nevertheless 
provided standing to indirect purchasers by passing “Illinois Brick repealer” statutes, a practice 
accepted by the Supreme Court. These statutes cover approximately 70% of the US population: E. L. 
Cramer & D.C. Simons, Parties entitled to pursue a claim in A.A. Foer & R.M. Stutz (eds.), Private 
Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the United States (Edward Elgar, 2012), 64-94, 80-83. Passage of the 
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) of 2005 may direct some of this litigation, when it concerns small 
claims multi-state, to the federal courts, if it was introduced after the implementation of CAFA. CAFA 
proceeds to an amendment of 28 USC §1332(d) and establishes federal jurisdiction for class actions 
in which there is minimal diversity between the parties and the matter in controversy exceeds $5 
million. 
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 C. Hodges, S. Vogenauer & M. Tulibacka (eds.), The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation: A 
Comparative Perspective (Hart Pub. 2010), pp. 3-186. 
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 Report for the European Commission, Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: 
welfare impact and potential scenarios (December 21, 2007) available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf  , pp. 
562-566 (scenario 1: double damages for all competition cases) & pp. 579-594 (Scenario 2: double 
damages only for cartel cases). 
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the Court of Justice, made the choice of promoting inter-jurisdictional competition, 
under the framework of course of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, in 
particular the second one, which is interpreted as aiming to facilitate damages 
actions. Some limited harmonization of evidential presumptions and procedural 
requirements, as well as the exclusion of national rules that may deny the right of the 
parties harmed by the competition law infringement to receive compensation also 
ensures the effectiveness of the remedy. Yet, the contours of the requirement of 
causal link are left to the interpretative work of the national courts, in view of their 
respective tort law doctrines on causation and the lack of a proper EU tort law. The 
study examined the different solutions that have emerged in these various national 
tort law systems in order to cope with situations of causal uncertainty that inevitably 
arise in competition law cases, in view of the complexity of the commercial 
environment and the multiple factors influencing markets. It transpired from the 
discussion that it is only in circumstances in which national tort law systems may not 
guarantee effectively the right to compensation of the victims of competition law 
infringements that EU law intervenes, for instance dealing with damages caused by 
multiple tortfeasors through provisions on joint (solidary) and several liability or by 
instituting causal presumptions. The promotion of the inter-jurisdictional competition 
that lies in the background of the choice not to harmonize the causation 
requirements should therefore be understood as aiming to guarantee a more 
effective enforcement of the rights of the victims of competition law infringements, 
thus leading to the need to adopt an instrumental approach when implementing 
causation requirements in competition law related damages cases. 
 
